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The Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division ( NAWCWPNS )
,
China Lake, California, is responsible for the development and
integration of missile fuzes for the Navy. NAWCWPNS is
experiencing problems in acquiring fuzes that meet Government
specifications. The purpose of this study has been to identify and
propose solutions to these problems. A survey was conducted to
obtain data from fuzing community experts, and the problems and
solutions so obtained are provided. The five principal issues
covered in detail are: (1) decreases in the fuze industrial base,
(2) ambiguous or faulty specifications, (3) the fuze acquisition
award process, (4) contract performance, and (5) the adversarial
relationships that exist between contractors and the Government.
Conclusions are drawn and recommendations for enhancements to the
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A. FOCUS OF STUDY
The Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition of military
weapons is contingent on a viable commercial industrial base.
From 1982 to 1987, the quantity of commercial firms providing
military weapons and services to DoD decreased from 118,489 to
38,007 contractors; this equates to a 67 percent reduction
[Ref. l:pp. 31-32]. This exodus of firms affects all
military-related industries, including major industries such
as shipbuilding, aerospace, ordnance, and electronics.
The focus of this thesis is the fuze industrial base for
United States Navy missiles. Specifically, the research
analyzes the diminished capacity of the fuze industrial base
at the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division (NAWCWPNS),
China Lake, California. This study also reviews problems
pertaining to fuze contractors and other Government agencies.
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
The objective of this research is to identify and propose
solutions to problems related to acquisition of fuzes at
NAWCWPNS, and to understand the underlying causes of these
problems. A synergistic approach to a review of the fuze
acquisition process has been used. This approach both defines
the difficulties associated with the fuze acquisition process
and also characterizes the interrelationships between issues
and officials. The research has resulted in recommendations
for corrective processes and improvement actions that are
expected to help maintain a viable fuze industrial base.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question addressed in this study is:
what are the key problems facing the fuze technology
industrial base and how can those problems be resolved?
The subsidiary questions are:
What are the causes of the decreasing fuze industrial
base?
Do Government specifications allow for contractor
flexibility in designing and producing fuzes?
What Government incentives or programs exist that
encourage contractors to produce reliable, quality fuzes?
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
The scope of this study has been limited to the fuze
industrial base as it applies to Naval Air Warfare Center
Weapons Division and the fuze connection with Navy missile
programs. NAWCWPNS is the Navy's primary laboratory for
research, development, test, and evaluation of new air-
launched weapons and weapon components. This thesis addresses
fuze acquisition specifically as it relates to the research
and development process at NAWCWPNS
.
E. METHODOLOGY
The initial material for this study was obtained from a
literature search conducted through the Defense Technical
Information Center; Defense Logistics Studies Information
Exchange; Dudley Knox Library at the Naval Postgraduate
School; and interviews with NAWCWPNS engineers, Contracting
Officers, contractors, senior military officers, and Program
Managers. In addition, NAWCWPNS fuze contracts were reviewed
and analyzed. Department of Defense industrial base studies
were evaluated to assess past and current problems confronting
the military industrial base. This analysis formed the
foundation for the difficulties identified related to the
DOD's industrial base. Based on this foundation, fuze studies
and contracts were analyzed and interviews conducted to assess
trends within the DoD industrial base in general and the fuze
industrial base specifically.
A written survey was conducted to develop a core data base
that could be used to answer research questions. The survey
was administered to various experts in the fuzing community.
Responses were cataloged by subject area, analyzed, and the
results documented.
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION
Chapter II provides background information on the Naval
Air Warfare Center Weapons Division missile fuze industrial
base. Chapter III describes the acquisition process and
interrelationships among acquisition officials responsible for
fuze contracting. Chapter IV is a narrative of fuze
acquisition problems that occurred in the 1980s.
Chapter V identifies the survey methodology and research
questions, and provides the resulting survey data. Chapter VI
contains a summary of the data, conclusions, the data and
recommendations both for action and further study.
II. BACKGROUND
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides general information concerning the
evolution, design, and operation of missile fuzes. A basic
description of missile fuzes and their components is included
to demonstrate the nature and complexity of fuzes. In
addition, a description of the missile fuze industrial base is
presented, plus the current status of vendor capabilities
within the fuze industrial base.
The nature of missile fuzes requires that a strong
research and development effort continually be directed toward
improvement of fuze capabilities and reliability. This
research and development effort is overseen by the Naval Air
Warfare Center Weapons Division ( NAWCWPNS ) . As the Navy's
primary missile fuze research and development center, NAWCWPNS
is responsible for the integration of missile and fuze
components into viable missile systems.
The introduction of fuzes into projectiles began with
early rifle munitions. But it was the proximity fuze
development of the 1940s that drastically revised the
traditional impact fuze to mechanically-controlled detonation.
It was also the proximity fuze that provided the change from
Government-produced munitions and fuzes to contractor-
developed and manufactured fuzes.
The solid fuze industrial base that existed in the 1950s
and 1960s slowly eroded to a limited number of vendors who
design and produce fuzes for the Navy today. In addition to
the decline of fuze contractors, the reliability and quality
of fuzes and fuze components has not been dependable. Because
of both the decreased fuze industrial base and decreased fuze
reliability, fuzes designed, developed, and procured by
NAWCWPNS have been targeted for technological and
developmental enhancement in the 1990s.
B. THE MISSILE FUZE INTERFACE
The purpose of the fuze is to detonate the missile warhead
at the time and under the circumstances desired. The fuze is
usually an electro-mechanical system capable of sensing or
detecting the target, while the safety and arming (S-A)
mechanism carries the initiatory explosive components and
safety devices [Ref. 2:p. 134]. If the fuze fails to
detonate, the missile essentially becomes a guided rock. If
the fuze detonates prematurely, it will create serious safety
hazards.
Missile designs have evolved to result in higher speeds,
increased agility, and longer range capability.
Unconventional missile shapes based on stealth technology are
being incorporated into future missile designs. These changes
require intensified research and development in the areas of
aerodynamics, subsonic and hypersonic flight, and the
stability and control of tactical missiles. As a result, new
demands are being placed on the design and reliability of
fuzes. [Ref. 3:p. iii]
Research and development related to fuzes cuts across
numerous Navy missile programs. The various types of missiles
supported by NAWCWPNS research and development include
anti-ship, surface-to-air, air-to-air, and air-to-surface
missiles. NAWCWPNS has been responsible for developing
missile systems such as Sidewinder, Harpoon, and Sparrow.
In addition to a variety of missiles, NAWCWPNS is also
responsible for a wide array of missile fuzes. A review of
fuze design changes over time is provided below.
1. Historical Background
Fuze designs tend to be evolutionary; designs are
changed incrementally in response to the technical or tactical
environment. Prior to World War II, military projectiles
relied on impact fuzes for detonation of the warhead. Impact
detonation occurs when the projectile reaches the target and
the force of impact triggers detonation.
During World War II, advances in aircraft design
resulted in greater agility and speed of aircraft. This led
to the development of the radio controlled proximity or timed
fuze. As aircraft became faster, the probability of a direct
hit and resulting impact was greatly reduced. The following
illustrates the situation.
It could be shown (during World War II) that a high
proportion of the shots passed within lethal distance of
the aircraft but the timed fuzes of the period ( even
assuming them to have been correctly set) were not
sufficiently reliable to guarantee bursting the shell
inside the lethal radius. [Ref. 4:p. 4]
The proximity fuze required more components and
greater complexity, when compared with the impact fuze. The
proximity fuze was controlled by a clock that prevented the
generation of a radio signal until a predetermined amount of
time had passed. The emission of the radio signal caused
warhead detonation. This control mechanism provided a means
of detonating a warhead close enough to a surface or air
target to allow the blast and particle emissions to destroy
the target, even if the weapon did not strike it directly.
2 . Current Technology
With the development of transistors and silicon diodes
in the 1970s, fuze size could be reduced to meet the weight
and size restrictions inherent in missile technology. There
are two prevailing technical approaches to the design of
proximity fuze timing devices. These are the mechanical fuze,
which uses mechanical components for clock timer and has been
in use for many years, and the electronic fuze, which uses
digital components in the clock and has been developed in the
last five years. Both techniques rely on the timing function
to detonate the warhead once the projectile is within lethal
range of the target [Ref. 4:pp. 5-6].
Most fuzes actually fired between 1950 and 1990 have
used the mechanical fuze technology. There are primarily two
reasons for the predominance of mechanical fuses.
• Production Technology. Production of electronic fuzes
requires state-of-the art, capital-intensive manufacturing
procedures. The fuze industrial base is currently short
of capability in this area.
• Fuze Interchangeability. Missiles in the current
inventory are designed for use with mechanical fuzes, and
development of an interchangeability capability is
believed to be too costly.
In view of these restrictions, the use of mechanical
fuzes is expected to continue into the next decade. Thus the
fuze industrial base must support both technologies. The
effort involved in providing this support can be better
understood by reviewing the components that make up a fuze.
C. FUZES AND FUZE COMPONENTS
A fuze is defined as a device designed to initiate
detonation of a warhead at a specific time or location.
Because the fuze is a critical element in the missile, it is
imperative that the fuze function properly during the life of
the missile. Missiles can cost over a million dollars per
unit, whereas the fuze may cost a few hundred dollars per unit
[Ref. 5:p. C-4]
.
Fuzes are traditionally composed of three basic parts.
Components are illustrated in Figure 1 below [Ref. 6:p. 5].
1. Sensor Assembly
The first fuze component includes a proximity and/or
contact fuze. Primary initiation occurs when the sensor
detects the presence, distance to, and/or direction of the
target, either through the characteristics of the target
itself or of its environment. [Ref. 6:pp. 5-6]
2 . Safety and Arming Device
The S-A device keeps the ordnance section safe for
handling and storage. It also arms the ordnance section at
the proper time so it will detonate when the weapon nears or
hits the target.
Because S-A devices are single-shot items, they cannot
be fully tested or repaired. For acceptance purposes, the
S-A device must be destructively tested using random sample
techniques. S-A devices are required to have a life that is
equal to the life of the weapon system in which they are
deployed, a very low failure rate, and high reliability.
Military Standard 1316 requires that "the safety failure
rate shall not exceed one failure in one million prior to
intentional initiation of the arming sequence." The safety
and reliability requirements are critical, as the S-A device












SENSOR ASSEMBLY S-AASSEMBLY BOOSTER ASSEMBLY
Figure 1 . Three Components of a Fuze System,
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3. Explosive Booster
The third component is the explosive booster.
Detonation of the booster is initiated by output from the S-A
device. The booster then initiates detonation of the warhead
[Ref . 6:p. 5] .
D. NAWCWPNS FUZE INDUSTRIAL BASE
During the 1950s and 1960s, NAWCWPNS had 18 contractors
who provided fuzes and associated parts. As the defense
budget was reduced in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the
decreased demand for fuzes caused several contractors to
abandon the fuze industrial base. A shift from multiple,
competitive contractor awards to limited competition with few
offerors became the norm at NAWCWPNS. In the late 1980s, the
fuze industrial base decreased to only six primary sources who
supplied mechanical fuzes to NAWCWPNS [Ref. 6:p. 12].
While adequate competition [two or more sources] could
still be obtained for some programs, it did not guarantee a
reliable fuze. Several of the remaining fuze contractors
encountered problems in delivering reliable fuzes. The lot
acceptance test failure rate for S-A devices reached an
unacceptable rate of 43 percent [Ref. 7:p. 3]. This issue of
reliability affected numerous missile programs, resulting in
delayed shipment to prime missile contractors of Government
Furnished Property in the form of completed fuze assemblies.
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In addition to the reliability issue, the fuze industrial
base is characterized by another significant change.
Contractors now not only manufacture fuzes, but they design
them as well. As noted in Armada,
The remarkable thing about fuze manufacture today is that
so much of it is carried on by commercial companies.
Forty years ago fuze design and manufacture was
practically a Government monopoly, commercial firms coming
into it solely as manufacturing contractors. [Ref . 4: p. 7]
The U.S. Navy first contracted with Eastman Kodak during World
War II to design and develop a proximity fuze. This began the
trend toward commercial contractor involvement in the
development of new fuze designs and specifications.
13
III. THE MILITARY ACQUISITION PROCESS
A. INTRODUCTION
The acquisition process and the acquisition team members
are the keys to successful fuze development and production.
The acquisition process can be lengthy, sometimes taking
months or years to award a contract. Given the complexity of
this process, it is easy to understand that communication
problems and ambiguities sometimes arise in Department of
Defense (DoD) contracting.
The DoD uses the Federal Procurement Process for
acquisition of weapons and equipment. Regulations governing
the acquisition system are covered in the Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) and in supplementary regulations and
documents. A summary of the procurement process for large
purchases is provided in this chapter, specifically from a
Naval Air Weapons Center Weapons Division (NAWCWPNS)
prospective.
The NAWCWPNS Procurement Department has unlimited
procurement authority. This department has been organized to
provide customer support procurement, rather than commodity
buying. Each division provides small and large purchase
support to dedicated customers. This specialized customer
orientation gives the Technical Manager a centralized
14
procurement entity for setting and meeting contract
requirements and allows for better understanding and teamwork
between procurement and Technical Managers.
Figure 2 depicts the steps in acquisition process for
large purchases, as these relate to NAWCWPNS procurement. The
responsible action officials are also identified because it is
important to understand the relationship between customer and
supplier.
B. RESPONSIBLE ACQUISITION OFFICIALS
1. Program Manager Interface With NAWCWPNS
The Program Manager (PM) is defined by the Defense
Acquisition Management Policies and Procedures , DoD 5000.2, as
"a military or civilian official who is responsible for
managing an acquisition program" [Ref. 8:p. 15-14], The PM
alone is responsible and accountable for the success or
failure of a program. PMs can be designated for major weapon
systems and for weapon component programs. For the purpose of
this study, the term Program Manager is used strictly for the
manager at a major system command level rather than at the
field activity level such as NAWCWPNS. For NAWCWPNS systems,
the PMs are primarily affiliated with Naval Air Systems
Command (NAVAIR) and Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). The
NAVAIR and NAVSEA PMs must rely on others for technical advice
15
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Figure 2. NAWCWPNS Military Acquisition Process for
Large Purchases. Acronyms are provided in Appendix A.
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and guidance. This required technical support often comes
from Navy laboratories; in the case of fuzes, it primarily
comes from NAWCWPNS.
The Navy maintains laboratories of acknowledged
excellence in pertinent areas of science and technology. The
laboratories develop and carry out scientific and technical
programs which have as their prime objectives the improvement
of naval capabilities, equipment, and systems [Ref 15] .
Therefore, PMs rely on NAWCWPNS and contractors to provide
reliable, quality fuzes. Problems at a field or laboratory
level can greatly affect the major missile program itself,
resulting in delays and increased costs.
2. NAWCWPNS Technical Manager
The Technical Manager (TM) is defined as the manager
of a program at the field activity level. The TM can be an
engineer, physicist, chemist, technician, or local delegated
program manager associated with NAWCWPNS. The technical
manager at NAWCWPNS provides technical advice and support to
the PM. In addition, the TM is responsible for the
pre-procurement documents such as
• Statements of Work (SOW)
• Specifications and DoD Standards




• Purchase Requisitions (PRs)
The TM is often the first link in the procurement
cycle, serving as the primary supplier of requisition
requirements to the Procurement Department. Just as
important, TMs are the primary customers of the procurement
process. Therefore, the TMs and Procuring Contracting
Officers must work closely together to ensure that the
Government receives a quality, reliable product.
3. NAWCWPNS Procuring Contracting Officer
The Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO) carries the
responsibility for assuring that the Government's minimum
requirements are met throughout the acquisition process. The
PCO has been delegated the written authority to contract for
the Government. Neither the PM nor the TM can obligate the
Government. The PCO is the responsible official who assures
that the acquisition process is in compliance with Federal
laws and regulations. The PCO is responsible for issuing the
solicitations requests, conducting cost or price analyses,
conducting and controlling all negotiations, and selecting the
source for contract award. The PCO also must determine that a
contractor is responsive and responsible, and that the price
being offered to the Government is fair and reasonable.
[Ref. 9:p. 1-14]
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4. Administrative Contracting Officer
After the contract is awarded by the PCO, contract
administration is normally assigned to an Administrative
Contracting Officer (ACO). ACOs are located at or near to the
contractor's facility and they provide Post-Award contract
support. In addition, ACOs assure that DoD contract
requirements are met. The ACO keeps the procuring activity
appraised of contract progress and/or problems [Ref. 10: part
42.202]
.
5 . Prime Contractors
The prime contractor is defined as "a contractor
having responsibility for design, control, and delivery of a
system or equipment such as aircraft, engines, ships, tanks,
vehicles, guns, and missiles" [Ref. 10:part 42.2]. The prime
contractor can be at a system or component level, that is, can
be responsible for the missile or the fuze. For this study,
the term prime missile contractor is used to designate the
former. The prime contractor is determined by the acquisition
award process. The Government relies on private enterprise
systems to provide the needed military weapons and components.
6. The Acquisition Team
In the acquisition process, the principal players are
the PM, TM, PCO, ACO, and contractor. However, many other
officials also influence the acquisition process. Other
participants may include the program's business or financial
19
manager, small business office, logistics requirements
personnel, legal counsel, and Congressional representatives
who request information. Understanding who is responsible for
what in the acquisition process is as critical as the actual
process itself.
C. ACQUISITION PROCESS: PRE-AWARD
1 . Mission Need and Funding
All acquisition programs are based on identified
mission needs [Ref. 8:p. 15-14]. The needs are generated as
a direct result of continuing assessments of current and
future capabilities in the context of changing military
threats and defense policy. Once a need has been established,
conceptual studies conducted, and approval granted, funding is
then allocated for the Concept Demonstration process at
Milestone I. A Program Manager is assigned within six months
after a favorable decision for program implementation. In the
case of missile development, the PM must determine whether to
procure the entire missile system from a contractor or "break
out" components such as fuzes for separate procurement.
NAWCWPNS personnel include a wide variety of missile and
fuzing technology experts. NAWCWPNS often provides technical
assistance to the PM and the missile contractor. If the fuze
is a "break out" item from the missile contract, then NAWCWPNS
is routinely delegated responsibility for the development,
20
procurement, integration, and delivery of the fuze to the
either the PM or the prime missile contractor.
2. Statements of Work, Specifications, and Standards
The NAWCWPNS TM is the principal agent in determining
what type of Statements of Work ( SOWs ) , specifications, and
standards are required for the fuze. SOWs are written to
define the tasks the contractor will carry out. SOWs can be
separated into two categories: design and performance.
Historically, NAWCWPNS fuze contracts have relied on design
requirements rather than performance requirements.
Design requirements control development of the item by
defining its design in sufficient detail to enable manufacture
of a product conforming to military needs. The requirements
include technical data that specify material composition,
treatment, finish, chemical, physical, and electrical
properties; fabrication and production; and other requirements
necessary to ensure proper performance and manufacture [Ref
.
ll:p. 518].
Performance statements of work and specifications
control development of an item primarily by establishing
performance requirements that are supplemented by quality
assurance provisions and form, fit, and function limits.
Requirements are expressed in the form of output, function, or
operation, leaving the details of the design, fabrication, and
internal workings to the manufacturer [Ref. ll:p. 515].
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3 . Formal Procurement Request
Once the requirement has been determined and defined,
the TM prepares the formal Procurement Request (PR). The PCO
reviews the PR for funding data, signatures, and completeness
of the TM's documentation, the SOW, and item specifications.
In addition, the PCO works with the TM to determine the best
contract type for the program. The two main types are fixed-
price contracts and cost-reimbursement contracts.
a. Fixed Price Contracts
A Firm-Fixed-Price ( FFP ) contract is recommended
for well-defined requirements that require the contractor to
deliver an end item for a fixed price. Few changes in
requirements should be expected in fixed price contracting.
Contract award is normally based on the lowest price from an
acceptable offeror. The contractor assumes the risk for
contract completion. [Ref. 10: part 16.2]
During the 1980s, former Secretary of the Navy
John Lehman advocated fixed price rather than cost contracts
for developmental efforts. NAWCWPNS awarded several fixed-
priced fuze development contracts during the 1980s. Some of
the fixed-price fuze development contracts that were awarded
by NAWCWPNS during this time period are discussed in Chapter
IV.
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A Fixed-Price Incentive ( FPI ) contract is
preferred when the contractor's assumption of a degree of cost
responsibility will provide an incentive for cost control and
improved performance. The Government and the contractor must
be able to make a reasonable estimate of the costs and
performance risks. The two parties must negotiate at the
outset a firm target cost, target profit, and profit
adjustment formula that will provide a fair and reasonable
incentive, along with a ceiling that provides for the
contractor to assume an appropriate share of the risk [Ref.
10:part 16.403]. NAWCWPNS has awarded FPI contracts for fuze
development and limited production.
Other types of fixed-price contracts are permitted
under FAR Part 16. However, FFP and FPI are the main fixed-
price contract types that have been utilized by NAWCWPNS.
b. Cost Contracts
Under cost-type contracts, the contractor is
required to provide the company's best efforts in performing
the required work. Cost contracts are used where the risk
cannot be reasonably estimated for the work to be
accomplished, as is necessary for any type of fixed-price
contract.
A Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) contract is
recommended for development efforts that pose a very great
risk for the contractor. CPFF is used when there is a high
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degree of uncertainty involved in estimating costs and
technical risk. The contractor is paid allowable, actual
costs plus a preset fixed fee. The contractor must provide
the company's "best efforts" to complete the contract. With
a CPFF contract, the Government may or may not receive a final
product. The Government bears the risk for completion.
[Ref. 10:part 16.306]
The Cost-Pius-Incentive-Fee (CPIF) contract is a
type of cost-reimbursement contract that establishes a target
cost, target fee, minimum and maximum fees, and a fee
adjustment formula [Ref. 10:part 16.404-1]. A CPIF contract
is recommended for development contracts. However, additional
time is required for contract administration, for
documentation of the costs, and for fee tracking, by both DoD
and the contractor. CPIF contracts have not been used for
fuze contracts at NAWCWPNS.
Under Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF) contracts, the
contractor receives payment for actual costs plus an award
fee. The advantage of using a CPAF contract is that the
contractor receives an award fee based on performance.
Federal Acquisition Regulation Subpart 16.404-2 states that
the "award fee should be used to motivate the contractor in
excellence in quality, timeliness, technical ingenuity, and
cost-effective management" [Ref. 10:part 16.404-2].
CPAF contracts require additional contract
administration for monitoring contractor performance. A
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designated award fee board is established to allocate the
share of award fee the contractor will receive. The award fee
is normally paid quarterly and therefore the board must
ascertain the contractor's level of performance each quarter.
Because of the extra administration effort involved in CPAF
contracts, policies were issued that precluded using CPAF for
contracts of less than $25 million [Ref. 12]. This high
dollar threshold has prevented NAWCWPNS fuze contracts from
being written as the CPAF type.
4. Small Business Set Aside
The next step in the acquisition cycle is determining
if the award will be set aside for small businesses. All
contract requirements are required to be reviewed by the PCO
and the Government's Small Business Representative to
determine if the contracts should be awarded only to a company
that is designated as a small business. If the item has been
acquired successfully from a small business in the past, then
all future requirements for that product must be considered
small business set-asides, if two or more small businesses are
deemed capable of meeting the requirements at fair market
prices [Ref. 10:part 19.501]. No large business may compete
when a procurement has been set aside for small businesses.
Historically, several fuze acquisitions at NAWCWPNS have been




Details concerning all acquisitions greater than
$25,000 must be published in the Commerce Business Daily ( CBD
)
unless this requirement is waived in accordance with FAR 5.202
[Ref. 10: part 5.2]. The CBD process provides prospective
contractors with notification of a planned Government contract
and allows contractors to submit a request to the PCO to be
included in the list of prospective offerors.
6. Request for Proposals
The Request for Proposals ( RFP ) can be distributed to
all interested contractors 15 days after the CBD notification
is published. The RFP describes the delivery schedule, type
of development work to be accomplished, number of units
required, testing requirements, technical data, security
classification, criteria for source selection and contract
award, and other Government legal requirements. Contractors
generally are allowed a minimum of 30 days to prepare and
provide proposals to the Government; for research and
development contracts the FAR sets a minimum of 45 days for
offer submittal [Ref. 10:part 5.203]. Most NAWCWPNS fuze
contracts are for research and development efforts; thus the
proposal period is usually 45 days or longer.
7. Contractors' Proposals
Contractors who are interested in performing work for
the Government must submit a proposal by the due date cited in
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the RFP. Each contractor's proposal is evaluated in
accordance with the criteria established and documented in the
RFP.
8. Proposal Evaluations
Each contractor's proposal is independently evaluated
to determine whether it is acceptable or not acceptable,
according to criteria listed in the RFP and the Source
Selection Plan. Since requirements differ from acquisition to
acquisition, the source selection criteria are tailored to fit
each acquisition. The two most common methods for selecting
the source are referred to as the low, technically acceptable
offeror and Jbest value.
The low acceptable offeror is determined by the TM,
who determines whether each offeror can meet the technical
requirements set forth in the RFP and SOW; this process is
often called Go or No-Go. Based upon the TM's
recommendation, the PCO then determines whether the contract
award is fair and reasonable and that the contractor is
responsive and responsible [Ref. 10:part 14.407-2]. Under the
Go/No-Go evaluation, the lowest acceptable offeror is awarded
the contract.
Best value is another source selection technique used
for contract awards. A Jbest value selection is the proposal
that provides the greatest value to the Government in terms of
performance, cost, and other factors. Best value awards
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normally include evaluation criteria such as technical
approach, quality, contractor's management, meeting schedules,
past performance, and cost realism.
The PCO and the TM work closely together to set up
measurable evaluation criteria. The contractor is informed in
the RFP what criteria are considered most important, in
descending order of importance. Contractors prepare their
proposals with the recognition that the lowest price or cost
may not be the best value for the Government, given other
factors.
The TM organizes a source selection team to evaluate
the offers and recommends a list of acceptable offers to the
PCO. The PCO determines the contractors whose offers fall in
the competitive range; that is, offers which are acceptable
or can be made acceptable based on technical, price, cost, and
other salient factors [Ref. 14:p. B-2] . The PCO and TM then
determine whether there are issues to be discussed with
contractors via the negotiation process. If negotiations are
opened, contractors must submit a Best And Final Offer (BAFO).
After BAFOs are received, the final award decision is made by
the PCO.
9. Contract Award
The PCO may award the contract immediately if there
were no changes to the RFP after its publication. If changes
were made during the evaluation or negotiation process, the
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PCO must revise the contract and get a final signature from
the contractor. The PCO also must determine that adequate
contract funding is available prior to award. The PCO then
signs the document. Once the contract is signed, the PCO can
request assistance from the ACO in administration of the
contract.
D. ACQUISITION PROCESS: POST-AWARD
1. Post-Award Conference
After the contract has been awarded, a post-award
conference is held at the contractor's facility. The purpose
of the post-award conference is to go over the terms and
conditions of the contract before the contractor begins work.
The ACO is responsible for initiating the post-award
conference. The conference should be attended by the PCO, TM,
appropriate contractor personnel, ACO, PM (if needed), and
other appropriate Government officials such as the small
business representative and legal counsel.
2. Performance Monitoring
At . award, the contractor is responsible for
performance, item delivery, and compliance with the contract
terms and conditions. If the contractor or the Government
requires a change to the contract, this can be accomplished in
several ways. These include bilateral or administrative
modifications, engineering change proposal requests, waivers,
deviations, and change orders. If a contractor is
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non-compliant in meeting contract requirements, the Government
has the unilateral right to terminate the contract for
default. However, the contractor does not have the right to
terminate the contract if the Government breaches the
agreement. The Defense Production Act requires contractors to
carry out their agreements under DoD contracts. The
Government is considered a sovereign entity and therefore laws
were enacted to protect the Government's unilateral rights.
3. Contract Completion
Before a contract can be completed, the contractor
must deliver all the hardware, software, and data required in
the contract. The delivered items must be in compliance with
the specifications and other contract requirements. The
acceptance of hardware and data can be critical to both the
Government and contractor. Once the Government accepts title
to the property, the contractor no longer is responsible for
the product.
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IV. FUZE CONTRACTING ISSUES
A. INTRODUCTION
Will the U.S. have the technology and the skilled labor
force to provide the military with state-of-the art missiles
and weapons needed in the future, as the military industrial
base continues to shrink? This chapter discusses three
acquisition issues that strongly affect both the Government
and its missile fuze industrial base. These issues are
summarized below.
• Government specifications
• Awarding fixed-price development/low rate production
contracts
• Adversarial atmosphere in the Government procurement
system
B. INDUSTRIAL BASE ISSUES
Several general issues that affect the overall national
industrial base also affect the fuze industrial base. A brief
summary of some of these general and fuze-specific issues as
reported in the literature are discussed below.
1. National Industrial Base Issues
According to Dr. David V. Lamm, the principal reasons
companies refuse to participate in Defense business are:
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• Burdensome paperwork
• Inappropriate Government bidding methods
• Inflexible procurement policies
• More attractive commercial ventures available [Ref. 15: p.
88]
The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) suggests
that there are ten underlying causes for problems in the
Defense Industrial Base.
• Program and budget instability
• Absence of market incentives
• DoD procurement policies
• DoD organization for acquisition management
• Emphasis on competition
• Product and process specification
• Life cycle costing [rarely used]
• Lack of reliable subcontractors and suppliers due to full
and open competition rules passed on to prime contractors
• Contract administration
• Management issues [Ref. 16: p. 32]
In a related study, the Defense Systems Management
College (DSMC) sent out 831 questionnaires to industrial
firms. DCMC received 244 written responses, and conducted 50
follow-up interviews with the respondents. This study found
seven areas where there was a significant level of








• Profitability [Ref. 17:pp. 1-5]
2. Fuze Industrial Base
The fuze industrial base has experienced specific
problems that mirror the national issues described above. In
1990, an industry and DoD workshop was held to determine
problems facing the fuze and safe and arming device
industries. This workshop was conducted by DSMC for the
Office of the Deputy Director of Defense Research and
Engineering. The top 15 problems that were identified were
• Need to use best value contracting versus accepting the
lowest bidder
• Limited Government technical base funding for fuze
development
• Lack of production requirements
• Lack of funds for facilities
• "Build to print" data packages, with no contractor
flexibility in the design
• Ambiguous specifications and regulations
• Inability to prevent underbidding the contract [buy-ins]
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• Adversarial relationships between Government and
contractors
• Failure to initiate S-A device development early in weapon
systems development
• Exhaustive, continual audits for compliance
• Decisions about fuzes made by prime contractors and
program managers who have not consulted fuze technical and
production experts
• Evolution of unrealistic Government planning and
contractor bidding
• Dilemma of cost/completion advocacy overriding technical
judgment in establishing qualified sources
• Unrealistic approach to second and multi-source
competition [Ref. 18:p. 6]
As can be seen from these extensive studies and
findings, several topics continue to threaten the fuze
industrial base. This study will concentrate on the following
recurring issues related to the fuze industrial base.
• Faulty and ambiguous fuze specifications
• Government emphasis on competition and fixed price
contracts
• Government and contractor adversarial relationships
The following examples illustrate specific problems in
the development, procurement, and timely delivery of reliable
fuzes at NAWCWPNS in the 1980s. The information provided is
a result of the analysis of ten fuze contracts and interviews
with 16 Contracting Officers, scientists and engineers, legal
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officers, contractor representatives, and Naval officers, as
listed in Appendix B.
C. GOVERNMENT SPECIFICATIONS AND AMBIGUITIES
1. Engineering Change Proposals
In designing and developing fuzes for production,
NAWCWPNS contractors and technical managers often need to
modify the original requirements. These changes can be a
result of new technology, ambiguous specifications, errors, or
changes in anticipated missions or threats. The contractor is
entitled to an equitable adjustment for changes which affect
the form, fit, or function of the contractual requirement.
The equitable adjustment can be in the form of additional
costs and extensions in delivery schedule.
Historically, NAWCWPNS fuze contracts have relied on
design specifications that require contractors to build the
fuze exactly as stated in the Government documents. With no
latitude to change the design specification, the contractor
must submit to the Contracting Officer an Engineering Change
Proposal ( ECP ) for every design change that affects dollars or
schedule. These changes may require two levels of Government
review and approval. At the fuze component level, the
NAWCWPNS Engineering Change Board approves the change. If a
change affects the primary missile program, the design change
must also be approved by the Program Manager's office in
Washington, D.C. This engineering change control process is
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designed to enable the Government to maintain control over the
configuration and documentation of weapon systems and
components
.
The lengthy and cumbersome ECP process causes delay
and disruption in the work, pending change approval. Some
ECPs have taken several months for approval and inclusion in
the contract. This delay forces the contractor to take one of
three actions.
• Continue working at the company's risk, assuming ECP
approval will come
• Perform other work, if possible
• Stop work on the contract
As a change is incorporated by the Government, the
drawing package must be changed to reflect the new design.
The design package modifications are necessary so that the
Government will have a documentation package that can be used
for future competition and product maintenance.
2 . Change Orders
Another method for implementing changes, to a contract
is by a unilateral change order issued by the Contracting
Officer. Government contracts contain a clause that allows
the Contracting Officer to make such changes within the
general scope of the contract. The three areas where
unilateral changes may be employed are:
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• Drawings, designs, or specifications when the supplies to
be furnished are to be specially manufactured for the
Government in accordance with the drawings, designs, or
specifications
• Method of shipment or packing
• Place of delivery
If the change causes an increase or decrease in contract price
or delivery schedule, the contractor is entitled to an
equitable adjustment to the contract. [Ref. 10: part 52.243]
Change orders can be negotiated at the time of
issuance or an estimated "not to exceed" amount can be
specified. In the later case, the contractor performs work
under the change while assessing its cost and effect. One
advantage of issuing an unpriced but estimated change is that
the contractor can continue working without disruption. Under
a stop-work scenario, the Government is liable for any
Government-caused delay and disruption.
A unilateral change order leaves both the contractor
and Government at risk. The risk for the contractor is in
incurring costs for which reimbursement may be denied later if
the costs are determined unallowable. The Government risk is
that all actual allowable costs may have to be paid, even if
the Government finds the contractor's business judgment
questionable in implementing the change.
The following case demonstrates some of the problems
in issuing unilateral change orders and in using a Fixed Price
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Contract when the item's design has not been proven.
Fictional names, contract numbers, and fuze models are used in
this example (and in all subsequent ones). This case resulted
in an adversarial relationship between various Government
representatives, with respect to the execution of the
unilateral change. An adversarial relationship also resulted
between the Government and contractor because the claim was
not resolved in a timely and efficient manner.
3. The XYZ Change Order Claim
NAWCWPNS awarded a multi-million dollar, Firm Fixed-
Price contract to contractor XYZ for the development and
limited low-rate production of fuze model 555. This sole
source contract, N60530-00-C-0002 was based on the
contractor's expertise since they were the only source that
could perform the needed development fuze work. The
contractor had received the previous design contract for the
555 fuze. The Government had validated the drawings and
designs submitted under N60530-00-C-0001 and used the drawings
and designs as the basis for N60530-00-C-0002.
In the case of U.S. versus Spearin, 1918, the court
ruled that "if a contractor is bound to build according to
plans and specifications prepared by the owner, the contractor
will not be responsible for the consequences of defects in the
plans and specifications" [Ref. 19: p. 327]. When XYZ company
experienced problems with the design, several no-cost waivers
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and deviations were submitted. When this did not eliminate
the problem, an ECP was initiated at an estimated cost of $1
million. The NAWCWPNS Procuring Contracting Officer ( PCO ) , in
conjunction with the Technical Manager (TM) and Program
Manager (PM) for this program, issued a unilateral change
order with a "not-to-exceed" amount of $500,000. The
contractor continued working and incurring costs. After
several- attempts, a successful solution to the fuze problem
was finally found.
The contractor submitted an additional $2.5 million
claim for the changes, stating that the Government had
defective specifications in the Navy's "build to print" design
contract. The claim took over two years to settle, at an
increased cost of $3.1 million over the original contract.
In this situation, the contractor was frustrated
because it took several years to resolve the claim. The
contractor originally received only a portion of the incurred
costs, the $500,000 change order, while the company's own
capital was used to complete the design changes. In
interviews, the NAWCWPNS TMs, PCOs, and contract specialists
expressed disappointment concerning the contractor's
apparently poor business judgment in implementing changes, and
the additional $3.1 million cost on a fixed price contract.
The XYZ company and thus the Government experienced schedule
delays. In addition, both organizations incurred additional
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costs and manpower expenditures in implementing and
negotiating the changes.
After the changes were successfully implemented, the
contractor delivered the model 555 fuzes under contract 0002.
Under a later fixed price production contract, XYZ Company
delivered several thousand model 555 fuzes prior to the
delivery date set in the contract and without further design
problems.
Through the process of negotiations, the claim was
settled without litigation. The parties agreed that some of
the specifications were faulty and ambiguous. In accordance
with legal precedence, the contractor was entitled to the $3.1
million equitable adjustment.
The 1980s philosophy of using fixed price contracts
for development was that the Government would know the price
of the contract and therefore cost overruns would not occur.
Neither the Government nor the contractors could foresee the
extent of claims and problems that can arise from using fixed
price development contracts. These claims were often the
result of the design specifications not being complete prior
to issuance of the fixed price contract. Currently, the use of
fixed price development contracts is discouraged. In the case
where development work will exceed $10 million, the PCO must
get prior approval from Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition) to use a fixed price contract [Ref. 20:p. 9].
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D. FIXED PRICE DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION CONTRACTS
1. Awarding to the Low Offeror
The Competition In Contracting Act was passed in 1984.
The purpose of this act was to assure that competition was
given first consideration in awarding Government contracts.
Simultaneously, fixed price development contracts were
promoted by U.S. Navy, resulting in policies that encouraged
the use of full and open competition, fixed price development
contracts. Theoretically, the Navy would receive products at
minimum prices via the competition process. Unfortunately,
the life cycle cost, that is, the total cost to the Government
for the development, acquisition, operation, and logistic
support of a system over a defined life span, was not factored
into the equation for competitive price awards. [Ref. 9: p. J-
7]
With fuze development and limited production
contracts, NAWCWPNS writes the SOW specifications at a
preliminary level. The contractor is tasked through the
contract to enhance the design and producible characteristics
of the fuze component. Therefore, both the contractor and the
Government expect that engineering design changes will occur
during the development and low-rate-production phases of
contract performance. With fixed price contracts, the
contractor must accurately estimate the quantity and
complexity of anticipated changes. When design or
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reconfiguration changes are estimated incorrectly under fixed
price contracts, the contractor may be forced to operate at a
loss. The company can submit a claim for an equitable
adjustment or provide a lower-priced, poorer-quality
component.
2. ABC FFP Contract Default
Since mechanical fuzes are complex and intricate,
NAWCWPNS has experienced several contractual and production
problems under the fixed price contracting process. In the
following case, ABC company, a small business, was awarded a
fixed price contract for low rate production of fuzes. When
the contractor encountered problems passing lot acceptance
testing, the company did not have the financial capital nor
manpower resources to resolve the difficulties in the
performance of the contract.
The Phoenix missile was redesigned in the late 1970s
to provide the Navy with an all-weather air defense missile
for use against supersonic missile and aircraft targets,
operating from sea level to 100,000 feet and out to 100 miles
in any direction from the patrolling aircraft [Ref. 21 :p.
195] . The FSU-10A fuze was to be a part of this upgrade to
the Phoenix AIM-54C missile. The fuze was to be provided as
Government Furnished Property (GFP) to the prime missile
contractor via the NAWCWPNS firm-fixed-price contract. The
Federal Acquisition Regulation clause concerning GFP states
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The Government shall deliver to the contractor, at the
time and locations stated in this contract, the GFP
described in the Schedule or specifications. If that
property, suitable for its intended use, is not delivered
to the contractor, the Contracting Officer shall equitably
adjust affected provisions of this contract in accordance
with the Changes clause. [Ref. 9: part 52.245-4]
NAWCWPNS was responsible for timely delivery of
reliable Government- furnished fuzes to the prime Phoenix
missile contractor. A limited advanced development, low-rate-
production fixed price contract was awarded to ABC Company on
a sole source basis for the Phoenix fuzes. When the ABC
facility experienced an explosion related to the fuze, the
company declared that the existing design was not producible.
NAWCWPNS formed a team of fuze and contracts experts to assist
ABC in resolving fuze production and delivery problems. After
three years, ABC continued to experience fuze failures during
testing.
During this time of production difficulties, the
contractor was operating at a financial loss. NAWCWPNS
finally terminated the ABC contract for default because of the
company's failure to deliver [Ref. 22]. Shortly after the
termination- for-default order was issued, ABC filed for
bankruptcy. In this case, the Government could not provide
the GFP fuzes to the prime missile contractor, forcing the
prime contractor to deliver missiles without FSU-10 fuzes.
ABC company is no longer in business, resulting in a decrease
in the fuze industrial base.
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Default of the ABC contractor caused disruptions at
NAWCWPNS and for the Naval Air Systems Command Program
Manager. The prime missile contractor was not receiving
fuzes on a regular basis, which resulted in delinquent missile
shipments. Several Phoenix missiles were delivered without
fuzes and had to be retrofitted with the earlier fuzes to
operate. At the present, a second contractor is trying to
produce the mechanical-type fuzes. These fuzes are no longer
provided as GFP to the prime missile contractor. The
responsibility for obtaining acceptable fuzes now is placed at
the prime contractor level. Only one source is available, and
it has not yet qualified for fuze production. The sole source
subcontractor must be qualified by the Government, which
equates to prime missile contractor reliance on the Government
for subcontracted fuzes.
3. Electro-Mechanical Fuze Technology
Fuzes have been made in the same manner for the past
20 years. Most 1980s fuzes used a mechanical-type technology
that requires craftsmen very skilled in development and
assembly of mechanical components. The primary technical
difficulties encountered by ABC company were centered on the
application of electro-mechanical fuze technology to the
design and production of the FSU-10 fuze.
The difference between mechanical and electrical
components can be explained by a simple analogy. The Swiss
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are noted as producing high-quality mechanical watches. These
mechanical watches require skilled artisans to assemble the
multitude of mechanical parts properly. In the late 1970s,
digital watch technology was developed and the use of robotics
in manufacturing was initiated. Well-made digital watches now
were less expensive, more accurate, and more reliable than
most mechanical watches. The old fashioned mechanical watch
now has become a high-priced luxury item. Robotics and
digital circuitry resulted in devices that were cheaper and
often more reliable than those with hand-crafted parts.
Fuzing and S-A devices are similar to the mechanical
watch, as illustrated in Figure 3 [Ref . 23] . Mechanical fuzes
require multiple moving parts that must be precisely assembled
in order to function correctly. For many years, the primary
fuze contractors also were clock manufacturers who were expert
in mechanical watch technology. The feasibility of using
digital circuit technology and robotics for fuze production
has been tested only on a limited scale and only in the past
two years. Thus, the Government still requires some
mechanical fuzes in the military's state-of-the-art missiles.
As with watches, mechanical fuzes are harder to produce
because of the number of moving parts that require assembly by
skilled craftsmen.
45















Figure 3. Components of an Electro-Mechancial Fuze
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Lot acceptance test failures have uncovered several
problems: mechanical interfaces, frictional problems,
non-conforming parts, non-standard mechanical parts, and
broken wires and parts [Ref. 24: p. 3], Large businesses have
not been willing to invest in equipment for unproven
electronic circuitry for uncertain Government programs. Small
businesses do not have the financial resources to invest in
expensive robotics.
Fuzing technology issues have presented a new set of
issues that the DoD must consider. For contractors to invest
capital in new technology, the program must be considered
stable. Changes in allocation and appropriations to the DoD ' s
budget affects contractor resources and willingness to risk
investing in potential programs. The need to update fuzing
technology is evident.
E. GOVERNMENT AND CONTRACTOR ATTITUDES AND COMPETENCE
The Federal procurement process can create an adversarial
atmosphere between the Government and contractor. The
contractor must determine what product information is
important to the Government and estimate the price or cost of
the project. Yet the contractor must remain competitive with
others in the field in order to receive an award. Often the
Government selects the contractor who has a minimally
acceptable product at the projected lowest price. If the
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contractor proposes a conservative contract price, there is no
room for changes without affecting the contractor's cost.
The Government and contractor often have worked against
one another in implementing changes . The contractor has
assumed that the PCO or auditor will not allow reimbursement
for hours and costs the contractor feels were appropriate for
the work. Meanwhile, the PCO and TM try to find ways for the
contractor to implement a change at a fair and reasonable
cost. Often additional funding must be requested from the PM,
who does not understand why the program cost is increasing.
The XYZ case illustrates how incorrect specifications can lead
to poor relationships. The ABC case left some officials with
a fear of awarding contracts on a fixed price basis and of
awarding to small businesses. The following examples
illustrate other problems that have occurred where
relationships have been strained.
1 . Paperwork and Audits
One of the primary complaints of contractors is that
the Government requires volumes of paperwork for each product.
The company must open its books to inspection by Government
auditors, who look for what is wrong. Under one contract
modification, the assigned auditor disallowed the contractor's
time sheets for a claim without thoroughly researching the
contractor's submitted paperwork. The large discrepancy
between audit findings and the contractor's proposal took
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several months for the PCO to negotiate. At the end of the
negotiations, both the PCO and contractor were disappointed
with the audit report that was submitted. In fact, the PCO
stated that the audit report was worthless and could not be
used [Ref . 25]
.
2 . Poor Communication
A fuze contractor incorrectly took direction from
Program Managers in Washington, engineers, and even other
contractors. As a result, several constructive changes were
made to the contract, and there were schedule delays and
product changes. The fuze contractor claimed to be doing his
job by implementing changes as requested. The PCO was
extremely frustrated by the contractor "end running" PCO
authority in implementing changes [Ref. 26].
3. Poor Workmanship
Under a fuze contract awarded to a small business,
using price competition, the contractor lost some of his
skilled labor force. When the contractor's product failed lot
acceptance testing, the Government discovered poor workmanship
in sub-assemblies. After consideration, the contract was
modified to extend the delivery schedule. When the contractor
missed the second delivery schedule, a "show-cause" letter was
issued by the PCO. The contract contained an ambiguous clause
on lot acceptance testing. The PCO then made a determination
to accept the units in an "as-is" condition, while the
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contractor agreed to a price reduction in the contract. The
components were shipped to another contractor for completion
under a separate contract [Ref. 27].
4. Design Changes Versus Type of Contract
On one Fixed Price Incentive contract for development
of a fuze, over 43 modifications were issued. This resulted
in increased costs of $1.3 million on a base cost of
$1,521,610 and a ceiling price of $2,468,000. The design of
the item developed under this contract was not mature,
resulting in developmental changes and the increased cost in
the contract [Ref. 27].
5. Limited Fuze Industrial Base
When the Desert Storm missions started in 1991, there
was an urgent requirement for fuzes and missiles. The
awarding of letter contracts for fuze components and support
was deemed critical to the war. For one contract, there were
two qualified sources for fuze model 123 and only one source
for fuze model 234. Desert Storm was over before the delivery
of any fuzes, thus avoiding a real test of the fuze industrial
base rapid-response ability [Ref. 26].
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V. SURVEY DATA AND RESULTS
A. INTRODUCTION
As noted in Chapter I, the goal of this study is to
identify and overcome problems that are resulting in the
exodus of firms from the fuze industrial base. Possible
problems initially were identified through a literature search
and interviews with numerous individuals who are affiliated
with Government contracting and the fuze industry. Following
this preliminary process, experts in the field were surveyed
to validate these results, to document the problems in more
detail, and to seek solutions. This chapter describes the
survey and how it was conducted, and provides the results that
were obtained.
1 . Survey Form
A 15-question survey form was developed (see Appendix
C), based on the problems identified and discussed in Chapters
I through IV. The survey was intended as a means to obtain
data on fuze acquisition programs and problems from the fuzing
community. So that the responses would not be artificially
limited, the questions were opened ended, and respondents were
allowed to provide more than one answer to a question.
For all respondents, the 15 questions were divided
into six categories: (1) the fuze industrial base itself, (2)
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SOWs, specifications, military standards, and drawings, (3)
the contract award process, (4) contract performance, (5)
relationships between Government and contractor personnel, and
(6) suggestions for improvements in the military acquisition
process. The questions varied slightly depending on whether
the intended respondents were Government or contractor
personnel, but the meanings remained essentially constant for
all participants.
2 . Survey Respondents
A total of 130 survey forms were distributed by mail
to four groups, as shown in Table I. The four groups are (1)
contractors, (2) Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC)
personnel, (3) Program Managers at NAVAIR and NAVSEA, and (4)
NAWCWPNS personnel involved in the fuze contracting process.
Of those distributed, 61 were completed and returned, for a
response rate of 47 percent (see Table I).





















Program Managers 17 7 41 11
NAWCWPNS Contracting Officials 19















Totals 130 61 100
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Participants were asked to provide information on
their position, years of experience, the programs on which
they had worked, and related topics.
a. Respondents' Experience Levels
Respondents were asked how many years they had
been involved in fuze acquisitions. The mean level of
experience was approximately 18.7 years, with a median of 18.5
years. Contractors made up the most experienced group, with
a mean of 32.5 years; the least experienced respondents were
NAWCWPNS acquisition personnel, with a mean of 11.5 years.
Program managers averaged 15 years of experience, DCMC average
was 17 years, and NAWCWPNS Technical Managers averaged
approximately 20 years in fuze acquisitions. The range in
experience was from 2.5 years to over 54 years.
b. Business Size
The survey queried each contractor to determine
the size of the business with which he or she was affiliated.
Three reported that their firms qualify as small businesses.
The remainder were associated with large business firms.
c. Missile and Fuze Programs
Respondents were asked to identify the missile and
fuze programs with which they have worked. Responses are
provided in Table II. A total of 18 air- and sea-launched
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missile programs and eight fuze programs were noted by the
survey participants.
TABLE II. MISSILE AND FUZE PROGRAMS



















3. Presentation of Survey Results
As noted above, the 15 questions on the survey form
were divided into six groups. Survey participants' responses
to these questions are provided in the following sections,
which are organized according to those six groups of
questions. The same format is used throughout Sections B
through G. First the question itself is given, followed by a
summary of the responses to the question. Then typical
comments made by the respondents are provided, grouped
according to the four participant groups listed in Table I.
In most cases, the comments are quoted exactly. Others
represent the combined responses of two or more participants,
when comments are similar. Section H provides a summary of
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the responses, and ties together the results obtained from the
fuze experts who participated in the survey.
B. INDUSTRIAL BASE
1
. Industrial Base Shrinkage
What do you feel is causing the DoD fuze industrial
base shrinkage?
Approximately 50 percent of the respondents answered
that the DoD industrial base decrease is a result of the
changing world environment caused by the perceived end to the
cold war, along with decreased defense programs and defense
dollars. Other factors affecting the industrial base reported
by the respondents are (1) the disparity between small and
large business competition in fuze contracts (21 percent), (2)
the increase in complexity of fuze technology, resulting in
contractors leaving DoD related businesses (13 percent), and
(3) profits regulated by the FAR, and awards to low bidders
(6 percent). Summarized below are typical responses from each
of the four groups regarding the effect on the fuze industrial
base of the end to the cold war and decreasing defense
budgets.
a. Contractor Comments
• Reduced fuze requirements in DoD budget as well as
internationally.
• Peace; there is no perceived need for fuzes.
• Declining military budgets as a result of peace.
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b. DCMC Comments
• The easing of the cold war and the shrinking DoD budget
c. Program Manager Comments
• Defense cutbacks -- only major players can afford to carry
the expertise and expenditures.
d. NAWCWPNS Comments
• Drawdown of research and development/production funds.
• Reduction of funding by Congress.
• Economics. Not as many fuzes being produced causing
companies to fold.
2. Contractors' Pursuit of Future DoD Business
In the future, will your company be pursuing
more or less DoD business and why?
This question was asked only of contractors. With the
declining defense budget it was expected that some contractors
would be seeking ways to move into the commercial marketplace,
since the Government is the only purchaser of missile fuzes.
The results from this survey validate that expectation,
although not to the extent anticipated. Most of the
responding contractors plan on pursuing the same amount of DoD
business or more. The contractors' comments are paraphrased
below.
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• As a leader in fuzing systems, the company will continue
selectively to pursue "core" programs where the firm
clearly has a dominant market position and maintains a
technological support base, or can realize an acceptable
return on investment. On the whole, however, DoD business
as a percentage of overall business will decline, placing
greater dependence on commercial alternatives.
• We are trying to maintain our business base. Current
budget cuts have resulted in a 20 percent decrease in our
DoD-related sales.
• The same amount. DoD is our only business and we plan to
survive any cutbacks by being a reputable, quality, cost-
effective supplier.
• Our pursuit of DoD business will remain the same or may
slightly increase. Although we are urgently attempting to
diversify into non-DoD business, our survival still
depends on supplying ordnance products to DoD. We are a
"full service" fuzing company and well established in the
community. We possess a "niche-like" technology and
"know-how" that is not readily transferable to commercial
markets.
• More. We want to expand the number of weapon systems,
types, and applications. It is our area of expertise.
3. Government Incentives and Programs
To assure the delivery of reliable fuzes, what
incentives or programs should the Government offer to
encourage contractors to propose on future contracts?
The two most prevalent suggestions for incentives were
multi-year contracts or development of long-term relationships
(39 percent), and higher pay for quality performance (18
percent). The participants also preferred performance
specifications over "build to print" specifications (14
percent) and contract awards based on best value instead of
low-bidder method of contracting (7 percent).
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a. Contractor Comments
(1) Multi-Year Contracts and Long Term Commitments
• Establish sole source, multi-year requirements to
facilitate long range investment and resource planning.
• Develop partnerships with fuze suppliers who perform
[provide quality fuzes on time] and assure long-term
programs
.
• The Government should not broaden its supplier base but
rather maintain a smaller number of best-in-class
suppliers. The Government's critical suppliers will have
a viable business base and will deliver quality products
in order to stay in the supplier base.
(2) Higher Profit/Pay for Performance
• Contract for items on a performance basis versus
specification base. Give/provide a contractor incentives
( $ ) for products that exceed the contract performance
objectives.
• Consider scaling allowable profits and award fees on the
performance and quality of the product instead of
cost/schedule compliance.
b. DCMC Comments
( 1 ) Multi-Year Contracts and Long-Term Commitments
• Use follow-on contracts without competition.
• Implement multi-year contracts for specific [firm]
quantities.
• Target key technologies and award in accordance with
keeping our industrial base active/strong. This would
focus in on a smaller number of key suppliers. Industry
is going this route; can the Government afford not to
participate in this trend?
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(2) Higher Profit/Pay for Performance
• Recommend that for contractors that meet, then exceed
specific process performance levels an increased "value
added" incentive should be included in the contract,
provided delivery schedules are met.
c. Program Manager Comments
(1) Multi-Year Contracts and Long Term Commitments
• Long production runs will result in higher return on
investment.
• Use multi-year contracts to allow cost-effective
production runs.
(2) Higher Profit/Pay for Performance
• Allow industry to propose reliability design improvements
and share the cost of demonstrating those improvements.
• Government should not be in the business of having to
provide incentives for the contractor to deliver a
reliable product. Total Quality Management is the name of
the game.
d. NAWCWPNS Comments
(1) Multi-Year Contracts and Long Term Commitments
• Government and prime contractors need to enter into long-
term commitments with fuze contractors who demonstrate
capability to build quality into their product, rather
than have it inspected in by the end user.
• If it's true that fuze devices for various programs have
lots of commonality, then we ought to be doing fewer but
bigger and better coordinated contracts to offer
incentives to quality contractors to play.
• Recommend that the Government procure two or three years
of fuzes at one time. This would result in lower cost
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because of increased quantities. Many private companies
such as electric component manufacturers make large runs
of parts every one to two years.
• Best incentives the Government can offer are to increase
the proposed production quantities. Currently, the
companies with the greatest engineering ability to produce
newer, high-tech fuzes are not interested because the low
production quantities don't make it profitable for them to
invest in fuzing. Increase the quantities.
(2) Higher Profit/Pay for Performance
• Contractors should be provided Total Quality Management
(TQM) training, and incentives tied to contractors
actively adopting TQM.
• Try incentive-type contracts with dollars and schedule
incentives.
• Incentives such as awards for successfully passing lot
acceptance testing would improve small business in
providing good hardware.
• Award fee based on timely delivery and lot acceptance
testing results.
• Money- -contractors are beating down the doors to get
whatever contracts they can. If it is becoming a buyer's
market and awards are based on going to companies with
proven quality, we will be ok.
• Incentives. Contractors should be given incentives for
positive performance on a real time basis, e.g., award
fees. Currently contractors are rewarded for poor
performance because Government buys hardware at Government
expense.
C. STATEMENTS OF WORK/SPECIFICATIONS/STANDARDS/DRAWINGS
1. Problems with Government Documents
What are the primary problems affecting Statements of
Work, Specifications, Drawings, and Standards that you
find most prohibitive?
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DoD statements of work and specifications have been
described as ambiguous in the national studies discussed in
Chapter IV, and are listed as one of the primary problems in
doing work for the Government. The respondents generally
indicated that ambiguous DoD documents have resulted in
contractual problems (31 percent). Summarized below are
concerns and issues related to ambiguity in Government
documents.
a. Contractor Comments
• Some statements of work are not written clearly enough to
allow the extent of the tasks to be discerned. This
causes risk which can lead to higher cost estimates or
failure after award. Any exceptions from previous
contracts should be disclosed.
• Statements of work and associated piece parts, prints, and
specifications are usually at odds with the stated or
required performance requirements.
• "To be determined" phrases in development programs,
without the discipline to remove them and readdress the
impact, is one of the problems with Government documents.
b. DCMC Comments
• Ambiguity, misinterpretation, conflicting interpretation,
wrong revision or level of drawings, unrealistic
specifications and standards.
Program Manager Comments
• Sometimes, even we [Government] don't know what we are
asking for. Most often, we clear up these ambiguities
along the way. This method of operation by default has
become a way of life in the Government.
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NAWCWPNS Comments
• There appears to be ambiguities in specs. Drawings on
contracts I have been involved with have been Level II and
moving to Level III without necessary testing done to
prove out design and/or design changes.
• Terms are too vague- -the instant people understand what is
required, they move around, priorities change, sponsors go
away, corporate history is lost.
• We [Government] don't know how to describe what we want
and industry does not know how to interpret.
• The primary problem with statements of work or technical
documentation is interpretation of requirements. Avoiding
ambiguity in requirements is a difficult problem to
overcome
.
• Primary problem is that people do not read or research the
statements of work or specifications. They copy what was
in an old or similar statement of work. Give the
contractor more latitude. Tell him what you need in the
SOW, the specifications, drawings, and standards. Limit
the options and you stifle new thought.
2. Government Specification Flexibility
Do Government specifications allow flexibility in the
design and production of fuzes? If not, please
suggest what changes should be made in this area?
The majority response to this question was that the
Government should allow more flexibility in specifications.
Approximately 65 percent of the participants asserted that
improvements in the design could be achieved by allowing more
contractor input. The amount of flexibility would have to be
determined by the program office, and depend on safety and
reliability requirements. Less than 20 percent stated that
the Government should maintain control of the specifications
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and drawings. Responses of the majority who favored
flexibility are summarized first, followed by dissenting
opinions when these are made.
a. Contractor Comments
All contractoi comments indicated their desire for
more flexibility in specifications. There were no dissenting
opinions.
• Identify the performance requirements of the fuze,
establish a vigorous acceptance test procedure, e.g., live
fire, functioning, etc., and buy off a performance test.
• Yes, again sensitivity to commercial standards and
alternatives based on form, fit, and function would
provide flexibility and continued commitment of resources.
• Provide more black box specifications and permit the
contractor to have the freedom to develop a compliant end
item.
• Virtually no flexibility is allowed. The specifications
should cover the input, output requirements and physical
characteristics in realistic terms. Then give the
contractor the flexibility to design the product within
those limits. Don't over-spec a product to where the
costs are prohibitive.
b. DCMC Comments
(1) Comments Favoring Flexibility
• Yes, but very clearly defined limits should be set forth.
Contractors in the fuze business, for the most part,
employ very competent personnel who have some positive




• Not in design. As the end user of weapons and munitions,
[the Government] has the ultimate responsibility for
specifications. Fuze functioning needs to meet intended
design needs and unless contractors test and fire to same
levels as the test and design activity, I'd keep it the
same. However, production flexibility, when it does not
affect safety, should be encouraged.
c. Program Manager Comments
(1) Comments Favoring Flexibility
• Absolutely; we are in the dark ages with both design
approaches and production methods.
• Yes, to avoid redesigning for producibility.
• Of course; they [Contractors] are the experts, why tie
their hands with rigid requirements. We must however be
cognizant of the effects of these changes on our baseline
design and environment.
(2) Dissenting Comments
The Government does allow flexibility in the production of
the items sought. It is not the Government's position to
tell the contractor how to do his business. The
Government specifies the requirements and the acceptance
testing related to those requirements. It is the
contractor's responsibility to produce, once the design is
frozen.
d. NAWCWPNS Comments
(1) Comments Favoring Flexibility
• I think there needs to be something to make contractors
accept more responsibility and ownership, and maybe design
flexibility gets them that.
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• The requirements should be more performance and interface
specifications. The system should be based on the
Government saying what they expect and having a
communications loop to provide feedback on how well the
contractor is meeting expectations. Currently the risk of
how good the technical package is for use in production is
with the Government. The risk has to be moved to the
contractor.
• The Government should work with the contractor to develop
the documentation. The Air Force concept of Mil Prime
contracting does this effectively. There should be some
flexibility but once the design has been qualified the
major emphasis should be on flexibility.
• Yes. In most cases we are specifying and the contractor
is building the same fuze as we were doing 20 to 25 years
ago. Things have been rearranged but basically it is the
same fuze in most NAWCWPNS-designed fuzes. We need to
allow the fuze contractors to take advantage of the
technology that has been developed during the last quarter
of a century.
• In the design phase, specs should state requirements and
allow flexibility as to the method to meet those
requirements. This gives maximum use of contractor
initiative. During production, flexibility should be
reduced to only that which can be controlled by the ECP
[Engineering Change Proposal] process. This will ensure
maintenance of performance for all items produced.
• Flexibility in the development phase is good as long as
the contractor is making use of the technical expertise in
the Government laboratories and not trying to do something
that is known not to work. However, because fuzes are
safety devices, their manufacture needs to be carefully
controlled.
(2) Dissenting Comments
• No, that's why we write contracts. Let the contract be
the vehicle for exceptions.
• The Government should have total control of the design.
The contractor should produce using the best industry and
technical practices with close Government participation.
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• No, the Government should always be responsible for the
design to ensure system-level performance. Past history
has shown that it is risky to buy black boxes from
contractors. Then we lose all insight into and
traceability of fuze production.




What type of contract award processes have been used
in the awarding of fuze contracts?
The Government bidding process has been identified as
a problem in conducting business with DoD, according to the
studies reported in Chapter IV. The survey respondents
provided a list of contract types that have been used for
fuzes which included FFP, FPI, CPFF, CPIF. The respondents
indicated that most contract types had been used in their
careers but the most reported experience was with fixed price
type contracts and awards to the low offeror (75 percent).
Under question two the respondents provided more detailed
opinions on their level of satisfaction with fixed price-low
offeror contracts.
2 . Benefits and Drawbacks of Contract Award Processes
What were the benefits or drawbacks to the award process?
The majority of participants in this study expressed
grave concerns over Government reliance on using price as the
primary award factor in contracts, especially in development
fixed price contracts. The most common theme was that the DoD
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should use the correct contract type for the work to be
accomplished.
a. Contractor Comments
• Too much reliance on going only to the low bidder
regardless of that contractor's performance or technical
ability. Limited technical knowledge of the item being
purchased by contracting personnel.
• Historically, fuzing contracts have been awarded to the
low offeror. Many of these companies do not have the
engineering wherewithal to support production. The
proposal/selection process takes too long. Restrict free
competition to proven producers. Select on best value.
• Sometimes the worst thing that can happen to you is to
win! If you take exception to poor specifications and
drawings during the bid cycle, you will be declared
noncompliant and thrown out. What happens is you usually
keep your mouth shut and work it out the best way you can.
• Full and open competition usually ends up being a price
competition and does not result in long term quality at a
fair price and on-time delivery. These factors in the
long term result in the lowest overall cost to the
Government. Best value should result in overall best
product for the dollar. However, it seems that all the
regulations and legal issues make this the most difficult
one to implement.
b. DCMC Comments
• Usually pricing has been the key factor, or so it seems
from our perspective.
• I personally think it is counter-productive to key award
decisions largely on price. The recent [X] missile
replenishment contract was delayed pending bidders'
protests and the price of the low bidder is so low that it
appears to me there may be problems in performance as a
result.
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c. Program Manager Comments
None of the Program Managers provided comments on
this question. Their contractual problems and improvement
suggestions were provided under the next question.
d. NAWCWPNS Comments
• I have used FFP, low offer [contracts] , but the drawings
were not firm. There needed to be design testing done.
Not enough money, so that when testing was omitted it
created horrendous problems downstream.
• Fixed price research and development [awards] are a
disaster, as are low rate production, fixed price. Too
many changes, neither party has flexibility. CPFF are
better; more flexibility, but a greater chance of overruns
and sloppy cost contract. Cost-plus-incentive is probably
the best but the administrative workload is tremendous and
so many contract amounts do not justify the extra
administrative burden.
• In my area, "low offerer" seems to be the only criterion
for awarding fuze contracts. The primary drawback is
that, if a contractor is qualified, it is difficult for
other contractors to complete on a cost basis. Therefore,
even if a contract is having current problems, the company
will still be able to low bid the contract. The
Government should actively require contractors to
re-qualify if the company is having major technical
production problems.
• FFP [awards] to low technically-acceptable offeror have
been used for some development [contracts] and for most
production contracts. Most contracts are open
competition. There is an inability to select the
perceived best offeror due to bid being too high. No
incentives to excel. Fixed price contracting does not
allow for flexibility nor encourage contractors to
experiment with improvements.
• Past fuze experience does not mean much when there is a
small number of companies producing fuzes. The ones that
are producing do not have a positive rapport with the
Government. This does, however, make awarding the contact
to an already qualified contractor less expensive. But
awarding to a qualified non-producer rather than a
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non-qualified production company will cost more over the
life cycle of the fuze. With the design submitted at RFP,
this gives the contractor 30-60 days to design the perfect
fuze. This does not work. We must then evaluate a
contractor on how fast they can create paperwork, not
their capability of design.
• Fixed price is good for production where few uncertainties
exist, but poor for development. As a matter of fact,
fixed price contracts are inconsistent with the reason for
doing developments, i.e., we do development because we do
not know what the integration problems are.
• Fixed price does allow for good cost control if there are
no changes to design or effort. It does not allow
communications between technical people. No flexibility
if major problems are found. I would like to try CPAF.
3. Improvements to the Procurement Process
How can the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division,
China Lake, California, improve the procurement award
process?
The responses to this question do not suggest a
predominant area for improvement. However, the best value
acquisition process (25 percent) and establishment of a
partnership long-term customer/supplier relationship (16
percent) were proposed by participants. Provided below are
summarized comments in these two areas, followed by a brief
synopsis of miscellaneous suggestions.
a. Contractor Comments
• Give more consideration to the type of work to be
performed and the most appropriate contract type for that
effort.
• Restrict free competition to proven producers. Select on
best value.
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Work in partnership with a few critical suppliers
DCMC Comments
• Because this is a highly specialized area with a limited
application and a shrinking market, I believe we should be
identifying key industrial base producers and awarding to
service our National Defense interests. Price should not
be the critical factor, [although] it always seems to be.
• Develop longer-running contracts, support the quality
vendors, and do not award to poor performers on a low cost
basis only.
Program Manager Comments
Place more emphasis on improving training in the
acquisition process, use prime missile contractors to
acquire fuzes rather than supplying GFP fuzes to prime




• Do more Jbest value [contracting] . Combine different
program requirements to make it worth a contractor's time
to compete.
• Develop more skill in developing and using best value
criteria.
• Award contracts based on past performance, not solely on
cost. Initiate multi-year procurement.
• Allow previous performance histories to influence the
contractor choice. Do not require that the lowest offeror
within the competitive range be selected.
• Establish a limited list of qualified industrial sources
and be sure to award them a steady amount of business each
year so they can build a competent engineering staff and
maintain a stable, continuous production line and stable
workforce. They can do TQM.
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e. Miscellaneous Suggestions for Acquisition
Improvements
• Cut the red tape. Throw out the low bidder philosophy.
Streamline the proposal evaluation process [fewer people].
Put the needs of the program first.
• Keep an open mind! Take advantage of contractor
expertise. Be willing to accept that there may be other
ways to do things than the China Lake way.
• Start by ensuring that the Government design is robust and
producible.
• Start over. Throw out the books. Require less paperwork.
• Streamline the number of approval/authorization levels and
required time for responses.
• Shorten the time for initial award negotiations and
shorten the time for contract modifications.
• Train the evaluators, engineers, and pre-award teams.
E. CONTRACT PERFORMANCE
1. Fuze Contract Performance Difficulties
In your opinion, what are the major difficulties
associated with performance of fuze contracts?
The primary difficulties mentioned by respondents were
problems with the specifications and design (21 percent),
problems with either the Government delivery schedule or the
contractor's late delivery (22 percent), quality of the
product (15 percent), lack of teamwork and cooperation between
the Government and contractors (10 percent), and the
procurement process itself (10 percent). With regard to
delivery schedule problems, it is interesting to note that
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most contractors felt that the Government used unrealistic
schedules, while the Government complained of late contractor
deliveries. Difficulties related to the top three categories
(specifications, schedule, and quality) are summarized below.
a. Contractor Comments
• When the contract is not well defined, e.g., to-be-
determined (TBD) requirements in a specification, or the
contract is subject to a lot of interpretation.
• Unrealistic development schedules are major difficulties.
• Little time to develop or consider alternative designs but
time made to fix.
• False schedules drive programs. Contracts driven by
dollars rather than technical goals.
DCMC Comments
• Engineering Change Proposals, waivers, deviations, and
other change papers hamper performance.
Program Manager Comments
• Schedule slips.
• Meeting schedule delivery dates; this may result from the
inability to do parallel subsystem design and
developmental efforts to prevent system integration
problems.
d. NAWCWPNS Comments
• Timely delivery and conformance to the drawings.
• Poor design by the Government, lack of up- front
engineering by the contractor to identify potential
problems.
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• Costly non-working fuzes (non-conformance to specs),
accidents, poor delivery schedule, failure to pass
inspection, and many changes requested by the contractor.
• Major problem is schedule slip because the contractor has
no incentive.
• The major problem currently is the inability of companies
to build a quality product. This is because the design is
not optimized for producibility and/or because companies
do not have production processes that build quality in
rather than waiting for the testing to weed out the bad
items.
• The contractor not following all the requirements laid
upon him and then being written up. Then having to
respond to inspection reports. Then having to respond to
the rebuttal of their response. We [the Government] also
have inadequate data packages and expect the contractor to
make it like it should be.
2. Performance Difficulties Caused by Pre-Award Actions
What difficulties in the performance can be attributed
to the pre-award actions by the Government and/or
contractor?
Approximately 36 percent of the respondents stated
that the problems began with statements of work and
specifications, while 23 percent identified the source
selection process as one of the problems in achieving
satisfactory performance. Provided below are paraphrased
comments related to these two categories of difficulties.
a. Contractor Comments
• No defined areas of work on FFP contracts or known
problems with the technical data package. Also the "not-
invented-here" mind set by China Lake.
• Failure to disclose past performance problems.
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• The Government often has a mind set concerning the design.
Most advanced developments are done in Government
laboratories and an understandable "not-invented-here"
factor usually accompanies the baseline design.
• Evaluation factors should be thoroughly thought through to
ensure picking the most competent contractor who can




• Engineering Change Proposals cause difficulty.
c. Program Manager Comments
• Design baseline is not frozen by the Government before
being given to industry. Sound production and
manufacturing processes are not used by industry.
• Poor selection criteria in the evaluation process.
• Sometimes the Government does not have a good
investigative team possessing adequate historical data
[about] a company. Thus, the Government is likely to make
poor judgments concerning the capabilities of a contractor
to fulfill all or parts of the contract requirements.
d. NAWCWPNS Comments
• The contractor has no plan to analyze and fix the data
package.
• Not enough preparation of specs, drawings, etc. Not
getting documented agreement on what is required on each
side.
• Many performance difficulties can be attributed to
preliminary plans or specifications exchanged in the pre-
award period. After award, when the plans and
specifications are finalized, they often contain
substantial differences between their preliminary and
finalized form. The Government usually expects the
contractor to perform to the final version but the
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contractor will usually only be willing to perform to the
preliminary version unless they are awarded
"consideration.
"
• Sometimes the Government is too rigid in its
specifications and will not allow contractor inputs to be
heard.
• Inability to go to other than the low cost offer.
• Government stresses low cost, not best value.
• Improper source selection criteria. Not enough pre-award
communication between all parties. Over-zealous
contracting officers that milk every possible cent out of
the contract price till there is noc enough left to do the
job right.
• Wrong people performing pre-award surveys.
3. Resolving Contract Performance Difficulties
What have you done to resolve contract difficulties?
For example, did you submit claims, engineering change
proposals ( ECPs ) , or request changes to the contract?
The contractors who responded to this question stated
that submitting changes would cause a more adversarial
relationship to ensue. The Government response to this
question was that the contractor requires more time or money
for changes. The allowance for an equitable adjustment to the
contract was not recognized by either the contractor or
Government as an "acceptable" practice. Also specified was
the lack of pre-award communications between the Government
and the contractor, and among NAWCWPNS, Program Managers, and




• We have used ECPs, changes to contracts, and claims. But
the filing of a claim was only used after all other
avenues were explored.
• Sometimes we suggest changes but usually at great
risk/peril to future contracts. Contracting officers do
not like to have their authority challenged via claims,
ECPs, etc. It is a rare command that willingly accepts
changes.
• In some cases we submit changes, but that can lead to bad
customer relationships.
• We usually try not to submit claims for technical data
package deficiencies in production programs. If we were
the developer, we feel responsible for the data package.
In other situations, as in "build to print" contracts, we
try to work out the problems via mutually agreed ECPs.
b. DCMC Comments
• We strive to do the best pre-award we can.
c. Program Manager Comments
• Thorough design quality by Government. Thorough technical
review of potential offerors. Clean and well-understood
specifications and drawing packages by a full-time,
permanent Government engineering staff.
• Action must be initiated outside the process. Once you
are underway, its like paddling upstream; you just go with
the flow.
• In my case, we have identified the history of lot
acceptance testing failure rates and briefed industry on




• Numerous ECPs were issued. Contractor filed a large
claim.
• Changes were done but it was too late to avoid very costly
disagreements. One of the biggest problems is having too
many people at too many sites involved. .. the Washington
sponsor has to look at things which may take literally
months, then China Lake has to look at them which may take
more months, the procurement folks do their thing, more
months, then after all this, it may be dropped or the
funds may not be forthcoming. These problems could be
lessened with more cooperation among all the players.
• With the lack of fuze producers, termination is almost
impossible because there is nowhere else to go (no other
source). Consequently, the Government develops "tiger
teams" to go help the contractor get back on track.
• My experience in resolving difficulties has been to change
the requirements, if technically acceptable, or pay the
contractor more money if not technically acceptable.
• Few changes because our sponsor controls our actions and
they work to a different agenda.
• All types of changes have been undertaken at one time.
However, attempting to fix the problems after the contract
award is not very satisfying or efficient.
• Mostly issued contract modifications to make schedule
changes, sometimes getting small consideration in return.
A couple of times issued a termination for default,
although this can be very time consuming if litigation
results.
• After contract award then it is ECP time, time to change
the drawings or specification even though this should have
been done prior to contract award. The thing you really
do not want to do is issue a termination notice.
Some responses suggest that better communication might
be the key to resolution of Government and contractor
performance difficulties:
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• The Government personnel must get in and work with the
contractor to resolve these problems. We need to pull
down our barriers and quick-pointing fingers and get on
with giving the fleet what is needed.
• Sometimes the contractors have submitted options or
alternatives at the Government's request, which allows
some flexibility on both sides to get a performing product
at a reasonable cost and schedule.
• My current attempt to resolve difficulties is to educate
people (Government and industry) about the problem.
Resolution will be the result of both Government and
industry working together to fix the problems. I think
each is incapable of fixing the problems on their own.
4. GFP Fuzes Provided to Prime Missile Contractors
Are fuzes provided as Government Furnished Property or
"Make or Buy" under your contract? What problems have
you experienced in this area?
This auxiliary question was addressed to prime missile
contractors and to subcontractors who provide fuzes for prime
contractors. The purpose of this question was to determine if
GFP fuzes result in work disruption and missile program
delays. The following responses were received.
a. Prime Missile Contractor Comments
• We were forced to request relief from delivering fuzes
with missiles, and provided consideration to the
Government for our missile contracts. We had serious
concerns with this due to the fact it has always been our
position that there was only one qualified supplier, and
the Government played a part in the supplier delivery
problems. The Government currently is qualifying the only
known supplier of these fuzes, even though we have two
production contracts to deliver compete missiles. This a
very awkward situation for us, since the baseline is being
determined by the Government with a Government-selected
source even though we eventually will have to supply fuzes
provided from that source. It is highly inappropriate to
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think we could afford to qualify another supplier or that
the Government would pay to support the qualification of
another source. We might be willing to accept a contract
to design and build an electronic safe and arming device
but not a mechanical fuze. We are currently working
closely with Government agencies including NAWCWPNS on the
design of an electronic safe and arming device for fuzes.
• As a prime missile contractor, we did not possess the
mechanical fuze technology to produce the fuze in house.
The fuze had been subcontracted to previously-qualified
mechanical fuze contractors. When our company experienced
delays in delivery and reliability problems with the
mechanical subcontracted fuzes, we worked in conjunction
with NAWCWPNS to qualify an electrical fuze for our
missile.
• Our issues have been the same whether the fuzes were GFP
or made in house. There were costly DoD specifications
and standards. Time variations in development and
production cycle of individual fuzing components preclude
the most efficient approach to overall systems designs,
i.e., S-A systems, fuze contact devices, and proximity
sensors are based on non-current technologies.
b. Fuze Subcontractor Comments
• Your concern should be to maintain a viable fuzing base.
Prime contractors are developing their own fuzing groups
and ignoring the established community. However, fuzing
then becomes a very small portion of their business mix
and is readily abandoned if not profitable by their
standards. This is risky for the Government and could
seriously impair the surge and mobilization base you now
have.
F. BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS
1. Adversarial and Weak Interrelationships
In your opinion, are there any weak (e.g., lack of
training/knowledge) or adversarial relationships in
your dealings with the Government?
Over 50 percent of the responses described weak or
adversarial relationships, while 20 percent were extremely
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satisfied with their business relationships. Both the
adversarial and positive business relationships are
represented in the comments below.
a. Contractor Comments
(1) Adversarial Comments
• Dealing with the Government at all levels has become more
and more an adversarial relationship. This is not Service
related, but spans all Services. The fraud and deceit by
a few, especially primes, have taken their toll on smaller
companies . Auditing is a nightmare. Negotiation
positions are unrealistic.
• There seems to be a general feeling by some people in
Government that they should treat contractors in an
adversarial manner, e.g., get the most out of the
contractor even if it kills him. The way to get the job
done is both parties have to work as partners. The
Government should get a quality product at a fair price
and the contractor should make a reasonable profit.
• Getting better, but still adversarial with Defense
Contract Administration Services, make-work audits.
Customer program, contractual, and audit personnel work
independently—goals are not the same, creates both
technical and financial problems.
(2) Positive Comments
• No. The relationship with the Government has been very




• Lack of knowledge on criticality of fuze functions and
safe separation distance requirements causes problem in
decisions.
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• Lack of communication, especially with the technical
activities.
(2) Positive Comments
None were provided in this category by DCMC respondents
c. Program Manager Comments
(1) Adversarial Comments
• General lack of understanding of each other's role and
responsibility throughout the process.
• Yes, enough said; I could write a book.
• Other organizations tend to operate differently to some
degree and also have different priorities which tend to
sometimes frustrate those of us trying to meet certain
deadlines.
(2) Positive Comments
• In my program, No. Government team is of one mind.
Contractor very sensitive to any issue, due to cost and
schedule impacts and difficulty getting up to speed.
d. NAWCWPNS Comments
(1) Adversarial Comments
• Yes!!! Contractors blame the Government, the Government
blames the contractors. It is probably equally both's
fault. I have heard tons of complaints from ACOs, QARs,
engineers, sponsors about: they are late, they don't
comply, they want waivers, ECPs, they want more money to
fix problems they either caused or should have been smart
enough to prevent; the little fuze is holding up a huge
missile program. Primes say the same thing. Mostly, I
have heard fuze contractors complain about us not being
fair to them, and it's unreasonable to meet our schedules
within budget and be compliant. There is a huge lack of
trust with certain companies and employees.
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• Sponsor contributed to this problem. Long-standing
relationships with contractor also clouded issues.
• There often seems to be unrealistic goals set by the
sponsors. However, when we are faced with a totally
disastrous contract or program, there is usually enough
blame to spread over everyone.
• Yes, there have been. Primarily this is a function of
"rice bowls" and the contractors playing one off against
the other.
• Adversarial relationships between Government agencies or
with the contractors in areas of technology, management,
contracts, documentation, etc., are not uncommon. Weak
relationships exist, but they do not survive long because
the weak elements are soon replaced or by-passed.
• Yes, many local DCMC functions assume an adversarial
relationship with the contractor. Therefore conflicts
arise and both parties lose sight of the major goals.
• Yes. First the basic nature of the contracts process
itself creates an adversarial relationship. Talk with
PCOs what they have to do to get past the contract review
board. Also the ACOs and QARs are a problem; it appears
they are worried about having their jobs taken away. Plus
inadequate staffing resulting in time delays is a problem.
(2) Positive Comments
• Most of the relationships have been satisfactory,
especially this past year. DCMC has redefined who their
customer is and are providing better service.
• In most cases it has been very good.
• The technical community usually works well together.
2. Improvements to Interrelationships
What can be changed to encourage better relationships?
Analysis of the survey results revealed that 24
percent of the participants suggest that improving
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communications would enhance relationships among those in the
fuze community for both Government and contractor personnel.
Establishing long-term relationships with suppliers and
teamwork among members were solutions proposed by 23 percent
of the participants. More than 50 percent of participating
Program Managers reported that they are satisfied with the
contract and technical support they receive from NAWCWPNS.
A total of 11 percent of all respondents stated that they were
happy with the status quo.
Other suggestions included better program support by
upper and middle management in understanding the issues and
empowering acquisition personnel, incorporation of a systems
management process, trust of other agencies, and cross
training. Quoted or paraphrased below are comments from
respondents concerning (1) improved communications, (2) the
Total Quality Management (TQM) philosophy and long-term
relationship arrangements, and (3) positive comments on what




• More open communications with less emphasis on contractual
impact.
• Improve communications to all parties involved.
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(2) TQM and Long-Term Relationships
• TQM principles that are used in the commercial world
between contractors and suppliers should be taught and
used between the Government and its suppliers.
• Really foster partnerships in all disciplines, between
primes and subcontractors.
• We should explore ways to work as a team to the mutual
benefit of the Government and contractor, as well as the
taxpayer.
(3) Positive Comments
None were provided in this category by the contractors who
participated in this study.
b. DCMC Comments
( 1) Communications
• More frequent visits by PCOs and managers to contractor
facilities and to interface with contract management
personnel
.
• Anything that fosters improved communication and
eliminates redundant administration effort will encourage
better relationships.
(2) TQM and Long-Term Relationships
No comments were provided in this category by the DCMC
survey participants.
(3) Positive Comments




c. Program Manager Comments
(1) Communications
No comments were provided in this category by the Program
Managers.
(2) TQM and Long-Term Relationships
None were provided in this category by the Program
Managers.
(3) Positive Comments
• Upon my request for assistance, NAWCWPNS provided me with
expeditious, excellent technical support and information.
• The work done by a PCO at China Lake on a recent fuze
contract was excellent. Her persistence in holding the
contractor to all necessary deliveries helped in getting
the product on schedule and without additional charges the
contractor wanted to impose.
• It is improving in the fuze arena, but we will need to
continue the efforts for the next few years.
• My NAWCWPNS technical support is super; however, this is




• Better communication from the beginning of the procurement
with better planning and realistic planning.
• Better communication. Government and contractors need to
be better suppliers and better customers. We need to
understand our roles.
• Clarity and defined responsibilities.
• Frequent dialogue and face-to-face [discussions] to
understand each other's problems.
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• Visit the plant, talk with the Government plant
representative, call them.
(2) TQM and Long-Term Relationships
• Demand TQM, customer/supplier awareness, process control.
• More thorough education for all those involved that
procurement is a team effort.
• Establish long-term relationships.
• Our technical managers must become more in tune with
sponsors' needs and work to support those needs. Build
confidence in our ability. Be there when we are needed.
Exceed their customer expectations.
• Make the PCO and AGO part of the acquisition team, along
with the system sponsor and the laboratory engineering
team.
• More team building.
(3) Positive Comments
• I can't answer because I have good relationships now.
G. FUZE ACQUISITION IMPROVEMENTS
This section of the questionnaire consisted of a single
question.
In your opinion, if you could improve or change any
three areas in fuze contracting, what would they be
and why?
The purpose of this question was to encourage
respondents to synthesize the previous answers and to suggest
changes and improvements to the DoD process of acquiring
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fuzes. Suggested changes and improvements fell into five
major categories, listed here in descending order, from
highest to lowest response rates.
• Use of TQM and long-term relationships
• Implementation of Jbest value source selection in fuze
acquisition
• Use of performance specifications versus "build to print"
and clean preparation of data packages
• Streamlining the acquisition process
• Providing monetary incentives to contractors for quality
and prompt delivery
Comments related to these five areas are summarized below.
a. Contractor Comments
(1) TQM and Long-Term Relationships
• Via TQM, reduce paperwork and meetings. Increase
effective technical [assistance] and support.
• Use TQM principles between the Government, contractor, and
suppliers.
• Establish a long-term relationship with your top-
performing contractors and work with them to ensure the
highest quality and most economical products for the
Government
.
(2) Best Value Acquisition
• Increase emphasis on purchasing Jbest value, not the lowest
price. Industry is doing this and the Government should
too.
• Emphasis on "true value" as selection criterion.
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(3) Performance Specifications and Data Packages
• I would use "performance" contracting versus "build to
print" and buy off hardware in real-world tests, e.g.,
actual test firings.
• More emphasis on commercial specifications and standards
of reliability which may exceed DoD requirements, at a
fraction of initial development, production, and logistics
costs.
(4) Streamlined Acquisition Process
• Improve the cycle time required at every level of
contracting from award to final payment of the contract,
because time is still money.
(5) Financial Incentives in the Contract
• Realistic schedules and adequate financial rewards for
performance.
b. DCMC Comments
(1) TQM and Long-Term Relationships
• DoD should be focusing on our smaller resources (funding
and personnel), developing a much smaller circle of strong
suppliers. With the TQM philosophy, we should strive for
continual improvement and focus in on establishing and
maintaining essential technology and capability in our
vendor base.
(2) Best Value Acquisition
DCMC respondents did not provide comments.
(3) Performance Specifications and Data Packages





No comments were provided in this category by the DCMC
respondents.
(5) Financial Incentives in the Contract
• Mandatory process performance index requirements in all
contracts and reward ( $ ) for contractors that surpass
them. This would attain highest levels of reliable
functioning and safety.
c. Program Manager Comments
(1) TQM and Long-Term Relationships
• Involve industry more heavily and formally in the
development process.
(2) Best Value Acquisition
No comments were provided in this category by the Program
Managers who participated in this study.
(3) Performance Specifications and Data Packages
• Make industry responsible for both the design and
production, i.e., drawings and hardware.
(4) Streamlined Acquisition Process
• Streamline the proposal process; put the needs of the
program first.
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(5) Financial Incentives in the Contract
• Provide incentives for producibility
d. NAWCWPNS Comments
(1) TQM and Long-Term Relationships
• Establishment of long term relationships which should help
on improving quality.
• Management philosophy with commitment to provide world
class service and products. By doing so, the problems of
quality, unreliable units, and late delivery would
automatically be corrected.
• The Government needs to develop good, reliable
contractors. This takes a stable environment with a
partnership relation between Government and industry.
• Establish a stable fuze industrial base and keep a steady
stream of development and production contracts flowing
into those few, well-qualified sources to allow them to
make a reasonable profit and allow them to invest in
modern facilities and continuous training of their people
and improvement of processes.
• Develop a greater (which we can do) working relationship
with contractors. Present time we are somewhat recognized
as the "auditors." Always finding wrongs. We need to
work in the opposite direction, recognizing wrong, but
praising right. Working in this type of atmosphere (TQM)
produces, encourages, and directs productivity, and
strengthens relationships.
• Allow Government and industry teaming prior to and during
contracting.
• Procurement strategy, multi-year procurement for lower
cost and higher reliability.
(2 ) Best Value Acquisition
• Use Jbest value and different contract types
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• We really need to use different criteria for selecting
contractors. Much more attention needs to be put on past
performance and capability to produce a quality item and
less on snazzy paper design for a particular project.
Also, best value needs to be emphasized to precluded
getting an unsuitable contractor on the basis of an
apparent cheap price. A strong technical team needs to
evaluate the proposal for reasonableness, and companies
should be penalized for unrealistic cost and schedule
promises. We need to emphasize capability in the
selection criteria. We need to team with the company that
will be producing the item fairly early in the development
process to ensure concurrent engineering.
• Award contracts based on contractor's ability to produce,
not on past fuze experience.
(3) Performance Specifications and Data Packages
• Involve the contractor in developing the specifications.
They have a lot to contribute. Give the contractors more
flexibility in the design and production of fuzes.
• Better defined specifications and drawings.
• Get industry's inputs to the contract, via industry briefs
and question-and-answer sessions, before putting out the
RFP.
(4) Streamlined Acquisition Process
• I would really like to see the time it takes a contract
awarded substantially reduced.
• Simplified paperwork requirements. Contracts are very
difficult to understand and are very lengthy.
• Accelerate the contract award process. Most programs are
very schedule driven, and when trying to initiate new
programs the long contract award time (even with urgency
justifications) can be a negative selling feature.
• Simplify the procurement process to make it easier to do
business.
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(5) Financial Incentives in the Contract
• It would probably be better to reward whoever gets it
right.
• Incentive fee contracts.
• Maybe a cost-sharing type of contract should be tried.
• Provide incentives for excellent performance. We will get
better fuze suppliers and higher quality fuzes with on-
time deliveries.
H . SUMMARY
Analysis of the survey data has revealed that contractors
and Government personnel have coinciding perspectives,
regarding the missile fuze industrial base and the fuze
acquisition process. This section summarizes the data
collected via the survey of fuze contract experts, in
combination with applicable data from Chapters II through IV.
Findings are organized into six categories.
• Decrease in the fuze industrial base
• Ambiguous specifications
• Contract award process
• Post-award fuze contract performance
• Contractor and Government relationships
• Improvements to the fuze acquisition process
These categories are based on the primary focus of the
research (discussed in Chapter I) and on the collected survey
92
data. The summary will provide a solid background for
conclusions, recommendations, and suggestions for improving
the fuze industrial base and the fuze acquisition process.
1. Decrease In the Fuze Industrial Base
Both contractors and Government officials have stated
that the paramount reasons for a decreasing industrial base
for the military is the changing world environment due to the
collapse of the Soviet Union. This changed environment has
resulted in a reduction in the Defense budget for weapons and
weapon components, including fuzes. While the quantity of
fuze contractors has decreased, the Government requirements
for new weapons and fuzes are also expected to decrease, with
reduced military budgets. The willingness of fuze contractors
to make proposals to meet future Government requirements may
be contingent on the size of the acquisitions and on the
profit margins that are allowed.
In the survey conducted for this study, 39 percent of
the respondents stated that the Government should commit to
long-term supplier and customer relationships and should use
more multi-year contracts. The longer contract commitments
would serve as an incentive to contractors to invest in fuze
technology efforts. A subsidiary incentive mentioned by
contractors and Government representatives was higher profits
for quality fuze contract performance. Contractors noted that
their companies were willing to continue specialized fuze
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component work, although they expected fewer procurement
dollars to be available. Fuze component work generally is not
transferable to commercial efforts; therefore most contractors
prefer to remain in the DoD fuze business, if at all feasible.
2. Ambiguous Specifications
The primary problem listed by survey respondents was
ambiguous Government documents such as statements of work,
specifications, military standards, and drawings. An
overwhelming 65 percent of the contractors and Government
participants indicated that contractors should be allowed more
flexibility in fuze design. Overly-detailed Government
documents restrict enhancements to fuze designs. If
Government-supplied data are ambiguous or incorrect, both
contractors and the Government programs for which they work
experience delays and disruptions as evidenced by the XYZ case
study in Chapter IV.
3. Contract Award Process
Contractor and Government respondents reported
experience with a wide array of contract types, including
Firm-Fixed-Price, Fixed-Price Incentive, Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee,
and Cost-Pius- Incentive-Fee; but the most common and
troublesome contract type identified was Firm-Fixed-Price
( FFP ) . As discussed in Chapter III, FFP contracts are used
for well-defined requirement. The contractor is required to
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deliver an end product for the "fixed price" awarded in the
contract. The majority of survey respondents noted that they
have had experience with fixed-price fuze development
contracts which were troubled by claims, engineering changes,
delays, and increased costs.
In addition, several participants noted that the
procurement award process for FFP contracts is based on the
low acceptable offeror. The low acceptable offeror was not
deemed by contractors and Government respondents to be
necessarily the best value in technical expertise and product
quality. The problem resolution recommended by 25 percent of
the participants was specifying an appropriate contract type,
using Jbest value criteria as explained in Chapter IV. The
consensus concerning the acquisition award process was that
FFP contracts should be used only when the design and product
requirements are firm. An inappropriate contract type can
cause delays and increased costs, often resulting in
adversarial relationships between contractors and the
Government
.
4. Post-Award Fuze Contract Performance
Concerning contract performance, contractors claimed
that the Government's delivery schedule for fuzes is
unrealistic, while the Government countered that the
contractors were frequently delinquent in delivering fuzes and
fuze components on time. Difficulties that could be
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attributed to the pre-award process included problems with
statements of work (36 percent of the respondents), and an
incorrect source selection process (26 percent of the
respondents )
.
If post-award design changes were needed or there were
difficulties associated with the Government-provided
documentation, several ways to implement changes to the
contract were identified. These include engineering change
proposals by either the Government or contractor, contractor
claims against the Government, termination of the contract,
and bi-lateral modifications (the most common method).
Contractors stated that submitting design changes and claims
resulted in harsher adversarial relationships between the
company and Government. Government respondents indicated that
contractors were trying to obtain additional time or
compensation in requesting changes to the contract. To
decrease the adversarial relationship created by introducing
changes into a contract, the survey participants advocated
direct communication between the Government and contractor
concerning Government requirements and needed changes.
Information was solicited from prime missile
contractors concerning fuzes provided as Government Furnished
Property (GFP), and problems associated with this process.
The ABC case of the defaulted fuze contractor (Chapter IV)
shows the impact that a small dollar item such as a fuze can
have on contractors, Program Managers, Contracting Officers,
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and others. The missile contractors who responded to the
questions indicated that obtaining the mechanical fuzes was a
major issue, whether the fuze was provided as GFP or
subcontracted by the prime contractor. Advances in electronic
fuze technology and fuze components are being investigated as
an alternative to the mechanical design that may make
obtaining fuzes easier. The issues surrounding the change in
technology from mechanical to electronic are discussed in
Chapter IV and recommendations are presented in the next
chapter.
5 . Contractor and Government Relationships
Survey responses have established a direct correlation
between adversarial relationships and problems with
Government documents, contract types, and contractor
performance. Over 50 percent of the contractors and
Government participants confirmed that adversarial
relationships or inadequate training exist. A small minority,
20 percent, were satisfied with the interpersonal business
relationships
.
Inter-Government relationships were also characterized
as adversarial by some respondents. Two main suggestions were
made to improve relationships: better communications, and
long-term relationships with suppliers and contractors that
result in teamwork. Recommendations from the survey
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respondents on ways to improve relationships are included in
the next chapter.
6. Improvements to the Fuze Acquisition Process
Improvements that can be made in the fuze acquisition
process correlate directly to the issues discussed above.
Fundamental recommendations provided by the survey respondents
were
• Use Total Quality Management techniques, including
establishing long-term relationships between customers and
suppliers
• Implement best value criteria in the pre-award acquisition
process
• Emphasize performance specifications over "build to print"
whenever possible
• Streamline the acquisition process
• Provide incentives to contractors for high quality
products with timely delivery.
Improvements in any of these areas will also improve
Government-contractor relationships
.
The obvious conclusion is that the fuze acquisition
process can be enhanced though several avenues. The
acquisition process affects the quality of Navy weapons. It
also affects a substantial cross section of the fuze
population: small and large businesses, Procuring Contracting
Officers and contract specialists, Program Managers, Technical




VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. GENERAL SUMMARY
Chapter II has provided general information on
conventional fuze technology and the relationship between fuze
components and missile systems. Fuze components were briefly
described, including the assemblies needed for fuze operation,
detonation, and safety. The decrease in the number of fuze
contractors conducting business with the Naval Air Warfare
Center Weapons Division (NAWCWPNS) was discussed, along with
high lot acceptance failure rates. These changes in the fuze
industrial base are creating major problems for NAWCWPNS.
Chapter III discussed the fuze acquisition process from a
NAWCWPNS perspective. The NAWCWPNS Procurement Department
consists of technical support divisions for various kinds of
customers. The relationship between the acquisition process
and responsible officials was described in detail, along with
the acquisition process itself, both pre-award and post-award.
Chapter IV described several Department of Defense ( DOD
)
studies concerning the problems facing the overall military
industrial base and the fuze industrial base. Three primary
recurring acquisition issues have caused problems for the




• Awarding fixed-price development/ low rate production
contracts
• Adversarial atmosphere in the Government procurement
system
Chapter V reported the results of a survey of fuzing
community experts which elicited their opinions on the fuze
industrial base and the acquisition process. A total of 15
questions were asked, grouped into six categories.
• Fuze industrial base
• SOWs, specifications, military standards, and drawings
• Contract award process
• Contract performance
• Relationships between Government and contractor personnel
• Suggested improvements to the fuze acquisition process
The survey results are consistent with results of previous
studies, and confirm that serious problems are resulting in
decreases in the military industrial base capability. From
the information collected for this study, conclusions and
recommendations are provided below.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this study was to identify and propose
solutions to problems related to the fuze industrial base at
the Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division. The primary
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research question has been: what are the key problems facing
the fuze technology industrial base and how can these problems
be resolved? Information documented in the previous chapters
provides at least partial answers to this question.
1. Decreases in the Fuze Industrial Base
The fuze industrial base will continue to decrease as
a result of the reductions in the defense budget. However,
other contributing factors should be mitigated.
Reductions in defense budgets and the changing world
environment are recent phenomena and not addressed in previous
studies concerning the decreasing military industrial base.
Yet, in the survey conducted for this study, over 50 percent
of the contractors and Government personnel who responded
stated that forthcoming changes in the defense structure will
directly affect the fuze acquisition base.
2. Ambiguous Government Specifications
Ambiguous or erroneous Government statements of work
and "build to print" specifications have resulted in increased
costs, mid-contract changes, and program delays in both fixed-
price and cost-reimbursement contracts.
In studies reported in Chapter IV, Government
specifications were repeatedly noted to be ambiguous and a
major problem for the industrial base. Analysis of several
NAWCWPNS fuze contracts revealed that design and detailed
specifications are used consistently for fuze acquisition.
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However, the dozens of detailed specifications have not
guaranteed NAWCWPNS reliable fuze components. Approximately
65 percent of the survey respondents reported that design
flexibility would enhance fuze development and reduce program
costs. Design flexibility has been limited in the past to the
rigid Engineering Change Proposal approval process.
3. Contract Award Process
Reliance on low acceptable offeror, Firm-Fixed-Price
( FFP ) contracts for fuze development, along with low
production rates, are inadequate to meet the customer's and
contractor's needs, and result in contract terminations,
claims, and numerous modifications to the original contracts.
Analysis of the survey results, contract data, and
interviews confirms that fuze acquisitions have historically
been awarded on the basis of price and/or have used FFP
contracts. Both contractors and Government respondents
acknowledged that low price does not equate to a "best value"
product. Neither contractors nor Government personnel are
able to predict fuze design changes that will be needed during
development and transition to production. Thus it is not
possible to write a "fixed" price contract that accurately
reflects the costs of changes. As a result, modifications to




Contract performance has regressed as a direct result
of difficulties with specifications and the source selection
process.
Contractors and Government personnel report that they
have experienced increases in costs, program delays, and
disruptions as result of inadequate or faulty specifications.
Fuze acquisition delays have seriously affected prime missile
contractors and Program Managers. Additionally, awards based
on low price have not yielded the technical expertise and fuze
reliability essential for missile systems.
5. Adversarial Relationships
Adversarial relationships between Government and
industry are intensified by faulty specifications,
inappropriate contract types, and inadequate performance.
One of the principal problems for the military
industrial base is the adversarial relationship between the
Government and industry. Previous research data and this
study's survey results substantiate that the industry-
Government adversarial relationship persists. In addition,
adversarial relationships also are formed within the
Government and among Government personnel. When problems are
encountered in specifications, the contract type, the source
selection process, or either Government or contractor
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performance, discord between agencies and contractors
increases.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUZE ACQUISITION PROCESS
The purpose of this section is to recommend strategies
that can be implemented to improve the fuze acquisition
process. The final survey question requested suggestions for
improving the overall process. These suggestions have been
consolidated and are documented below. Some of the proposed
changes can be implemented at the NAWCWPNS level. The
implementation of others must be done either by contractors or
by other agencies.
1. Decreases in the Fuze Industrial Base
Long-term Government-industry relationships must be
established using conventional acquisition strategies such as
contract options, since multi-year funds and long-term
supplier commitments are not feasible.
Long term customer-supplier relationships were
proposed by both Government representatives and contractors as
a way to stabilize the industrial base and to provide an
incentive for contractor investment. Multi-year and multi-
funded programs were proposed as a way to implement this
suggestion. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) defines
a multi-year contract as lasting "more than one year but not
in excess of five year's requirements, unless otherwise
authorized by statute." But the FAR also specifies that
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multi-year funding requires Congressional authorization and
appropriations for more than one fiscal year. [Ref. 10: part
17.101] Congressional approval for multi-fund programs has
been only rarely granted, and then only for major weapon
systems programs. Long-term contracts with appropriated
multi-year funding cannot be anticipated due to the
requirement of obtaining Congressional approval. However,
NAWCWPNS should continue to use contracts with options for
renewal in subsequential years, when feasible.
A related research question is that of the minimum
sustaining rate of fuzes for economical development and
production. The most economical rate was not determined,
since survey respondents and those who were interviewed noted
that production capability varies from small to large
businesses, production rate capability depends on the type of
fuze, and changing fuze technology from mechanical to digital
alters the rate that will be economical. Standardization of
fuze components is proposed to permit consolidation of fuze
units and larger production rates.
2. Ambiguous Government Specifications
Statements of work, specifications, and documentation
must be streamlined to allow contractor flexibility in
designing and implementing reliable commercial products.
Performance specifications should be used for missile
fuze requirements, to provide boundaries on form, fit, and
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function, but not specify how the work must be accomplished.
These specifications would replace the design specifications
traditionally used for fuze acquisition, which require that
changes be approved by the Government prior to implementation.
With performance specifications, the contractor acquires
flexibility in design and development, yet reduces the need
for Government approval of necessary changes.
One strategy would be to adopt a pilot program similar
to the Air Force's Mil-Prime contracting methodology which
uses tailored performance specifications. With its Mil-Prime
program, the Air Force sets minimum requirements that
contractors must meet. The contractors include in their
contract proposals ways to meet or exceed these requirements.
Contractors also can suggest changes to Government
requirements and documentation that may result in lower costs
without jeopardizing the quality of the product or contract
award.
3. Contract Award Process
Best value source selection should be implemented and
improved in contract awards for fuze development and
transition to production.
A majority of Government and contractor survey
respondents strongly supported the Jbest value contracting
process for fuze development. The best value acquisition
approach requires that contracting and technical managers
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collaborate to formalize the evaluation criteria for award,
and contractors are required to provide very detailed
proposals. Although best value awards require more Government
and contractor effort at the beginning of the acquisition
process, post-award changes should be reduced and the
reliability of the final components increased.
4. Contract Performance
Financial incentives should be included in contracts
to encourage high quality contractor performance.
The implementation of incentive fee and award fee fuze
contracts could benefit both contractors and Government
programs. Both Cost-Pius-Incentive-Fee (CPIF) and Fixed-
Price-Incentive Firm (FPIF) contracts provide ways to share
cost increases between the contractor and Government. This
sharing of additional costs allows some flexibility on the
part of both the contractor and Government, but also maintains
an incentive to control costs. The FPIF award places the
majority of cost risk on the contractor while the CPIF award
moves the majority of cost risk to the Government. The use of
the appropriate type contract, whether CPIF or FPI, should be
based on the type and level of fuze development work required
under the contract.
The use of award fee contracts has been limited in the
past to multi-million dollar projects. Based on the critical
nature of missile fuzes, the reliability issues raised in this
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study, and the cost impact to larger programs, Cost-Plus-
Award-Fee (CPAF) contracts should be implemented whenever
feasible, for fuze acquisition. The award fee should be
structured around the Technical Manager's requirements for
managing the contract and limiting costs. Under CPAF awards,
the contractor who provides a quality product and is
responsive to contractual issues will to receive a higher
award fee than a contractor who provides minimal efforts.
5. Adversarial Relationships
More direct communication between contractors and
Government and among various Government agencies must be
implemented, to minimize adversarial relationships.
Relationships between contractors and the Government,
and among Government agencies can be improved by face-to- face
communications whenever feasible. Recommendations for
improved communications include the following.
• Continue to hold pre-procurement meetings between
acquisition personnel and TMs
• Hold pre-procurement conferences at which contractors can
provide input and gain better understanding of Government
technical and contractual requirements
• Improve attendance at post-award conferences by both
Government and contractor representatives
• Utilize face-to-face meetings or video conferences for
major contract changes
• Document and distribute to participants the minutes of all
meetings, to avoid misunderstandings
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• Perform regularly-scheduled program reviews and program
updates
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH
The study reported here has answered a number of critical
questions related to the shrinking of the missile fuze
industrial base. It also has brought to light several areas
where further research should be fruitful. These areas
include the following.
• A cost-benefit analysis of replacing mechanical type fuzes
with state-of-the-art electronic components should be
performed.
• The use of standard fuze components with tailored
assemblies should be evaluated, to determine whether this
procedure will yield a higher production run of standard
parts.
• A cost-benefit analysis approach should be used to
determine whether best value awards are preferable to low
acceptable offeror awards for acquiring fuzes.
• Concurrent engineering techniques should be studied as a
way to improve the fuze and missile integration process.
• The Pilot Mentor-Protege Program that matches small
disadvantaged businesses and large businesses for long
term commitments (five to nine years) should be reviewed
and evaluated as a way to increase the base of small
suppliers for major missile contractors.
• Establishment of a mobilization base for selected,
qualified fuze contractors should be studied as a way to




AAAM Advanced Air-to-Air Missile
ABF Advanced Bomb Family
ACO Administrative Contracting Officer
AIWS Advanced Interdiction Weapon System
AMRAAM Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile
BAFO Best and Final Offer
CBD Commerce Business Daily




DCMC Defense Contract Management Command
DSMC Defense Systems Management College
DoD Department of Defense
ECP Engineering Change Proposal
ESAD Electronic Safe and Arming Device
FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation
FFP Firm-Fixed-Price (contract)
FPI Fixed-Price Incentive (contract)
GPF Government-Furnished Property
HARM High-Speed Antiradiation Missile
JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munitions
NAVAIR Naval Air Systems Command
NAVSEA Naval Sea Systems Command
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NAWCWPNS Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, China Lake,
California
NPS Naval Postgraduate School
PCO Procuring Contracting Officer
PM Program Manager
PR Procurement Request
QAR Quality Assurance Representative
RAM Rolling Airframe Missile
RFP Request for Proposals
S-A Safety and Arming Device
SB Small Business
SOW Statement of Work
TM Technical Manager
TQM Total Quality Management
USD(A) Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition)
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APPENDIX B
LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED
1. Interview between Scott Greenmun, Engineer, Naval Air
Warfare Center Weapons Division, China Lake, CA., and the author,
4 December 1992.
2. Interview between Blaine Manson, Associate Department Head
Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, China Lake, CA. , and
the author, 4 December 1991.
3. Interview between Sharon Ballenger, Contract Specialist,
Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, China Lake, CA. , and
the author, 19 December 1991.
4. Interview between Susan Scott, Procuring Contracting Officer
and Division Head, Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division,
China Lake, CA. , and the author, 19 December 1991.
5. Interview between Sandy Scharn-Stevens, Procuring Contracting
Officer and Division Head, Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons
Division, China Lake, CA., and the author, 18 December 1991.
6. Inteview between Russell Spindler, Legal Counsel, Naval Air
Warfare Center Weapons Division, China Lake, CA. , and the author,
18 December 1991.
7. Interview between Mike Tyler, Branch Head, Naval Air Warfare
Center Weapons Division, China Lake, CA. , and the author, 18
December 1991, and 10 March 1992.
8. Interview between Steve Fowler, Fuze Safe-Arm Division Head,
Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, China Lake, CA. , and
the author, 18 December 1991.
9. Interview between Eric Saiken, Associate Division Head, Naval
Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, China Lake, CA. , and the
author, 18 December 1991.
10. Interview between John Gallagher, Branch Head, Naval Air
Warfare Center Weapons Division, China Lake, CA., and the author,
27 February 1992.
11. Telephone conversation between between Jean Piazza, Small
Business Specialist, Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division,
China Lake, CA. and the author, 16 April 1992.
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12. Interview between Rena Mueller, Procuring Contracting
Officer, Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, China Lake,
CA., and the author, 19 December 1991, and 10 March 1992.
13. Telephone conversation between Diane Foucher, Procurement
Analyst, Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, China Lake,
CA., and the author, 16 April 1992.
14. Telephone conversation between Dave Deneke, Contracts Manager,
Hughes Aircraft Company, Missile Systems Division, 5433 Fallbrook,
Bldg. 262, C25 Conoga Park, California, and the author, 8 April
1992.
15. Telephone conversation between between Don Bergeron, Contracts
Manager, Texas Instruments, 2501 South Highway 121, Louisville,
Texas, and the author, 9 March 1992.
16. Telephone conversation between Joe Clendenen, Contracts
Manager, Motorola Inc., Government Electronics Group, 8220 East




EXAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE USED FOR SURVEY
Company Name: Bus. Size: Small or Large
Name: Position:
Yrs of Fuzing Experience: Programs:
Yrs of DoD Experience:
My Company Was Awarded Contracts From
Naval Air Warfare Center, China Lake. YES NO
Industrial Base
1. What do you feel is causing the DoD fuze industrial base
shrinkage?
2. In the future, will your company be pursuing more or less
DoD business and why?
3. To assure delivery of reliable fuzes, what incentives or
programs should the Government offer to encourage contractors to
propose on future DoD contracts?
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Statements of Work/Specifications/Standards/Drawings
1. What are the primary problems affecting Government State-
ments of Work, Specifications, Drawings, and Standards that you
find most prohibitive?
2. Do Government Specifications allow flexibility in your
design and production of fuzes? If not, please suggest what
changes should be made in this area?
Contract Award Process
1 . What type of contract award processes have been used in the
awarding of fuze contracts? (For example, IFB, FFP-low offeror,
Other Than Full and Open Competition (Sole or Limited Source),
Cost contracts, Competitive Source Selection, Best Value)
2. What are the benefits or drawbacks to the Government award
process?




1. In your opinion, what are the major difficulties associated
with performance of fuze contracts?
2. What difficulties in the performance can be attributed to
pre-award actions by the Government?
3. What have you done to resolve those difficulties? For exam-
ple, did you submit claims, engineering changes proposals or
request changes to the contract?
Prime Missile Contractors
1. Are fuzes provided as "Government Furnished Property" or
"Make or Buy" under your contract? And what problems have expe-
rienced in this area?
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Relationships
1. In your opinion, are there any weak (i.e. lack of
training/knowledge) or adversarial relationships in your dealings
with the Government (i.e. PCOs, Engineers, ACOs, QARs, Auditors,
Program Managers, NAVAIR or NAVSEA Sponsors)?
2. What can be changed to encourage better relationships?
Improvements
1. In your opinion, if you could improve or change any three
areas in fuze contracting, what would they be and why?
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